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A New Era of Measurable Effects?
Essays on Political Communication in the New Media Age
Andrew M. Guess
In this dissertation, I explore the ways in which traditional processes of opinion
formation, media exposure, and mobilization operate in a networked, fragmented,
and high-choice environment. From a methodological standpoint, one of the ad-
vantages of this shift toward Internet-mediated activity is the potential for enhanced
measurement. In my dissertation, I take advantage of the data trail left by individ-
uals in order to learn about political behavior andmedia effects online. Combining
this measurement strategy with field experiments conducted in naturalistic online
environments, I am able to shed light on how longstanding concerns in political
science manifest themselves in the present-day media landscape. The overarching
theme is that, thanks to advances in both research design and technology, many
well-articulated concerns about the impact of the Internet on politics and pub-
lic life can now be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. As I show here, the most dire
predictions—about people’s tendency to cocoon themselves into ideological echo
chambers or opt for low-cost “slacktivism” over more meaningful contributions to
collective action—appear to lack strong support. But it is also clear that results
clearly depend on the structural features of a particular medium: Twitter enables
peer effects and the mutual reinforcement of viewpoints, while the high-choice en-
vironment of the Web may inherently lead to moderation.
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Introduction
In this dissertation, I explore the ways in which traditional processes of opinion
formation, media exposure, and mobilization operate in a networked, fragmented,
and high-choice environment. These concerns are not trivial: Extrapolating from
current trends, most Americans will soon receive most of their news online rather
than from television or newspapers. And beyond serving as a source of informa-
tion, the Internet is increasingly where politically relevant phenomena now take
place—from micro-level behavior such as deliberation and volunteering to elite-
level campaign strategies.
From a methodological standpoint, one of the advantages of this shift toward
Internet-mediated activity is the potential for enhanced measurement. Much has
been said about “big data,” the massive amounts of information about everyday
consumer behavior that accumulates online, either in public waiting to be collected
or on proprietary servers. In my dissertation papers, I take advantage of this data
trail left by individuals in order to learn about political behavior and media effects
online. In so doing, I not only advance the field by helping to orient it toward
emerging political and social habits, but I address several vexing problems with
the existing literature on these topics.
Another advantage of focusing on the Internet is that the nature of the medium
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offers intriguing opportunities for innovative research designs. For some research,
the use of online surveys may be a matter of cost or convenience; when studying
online media, however, administering survey instruments via the Internet is the
approach that maximizes realism. Since survey tools deployed online are embed-
ded within a subject’s existing informational environment, ecological validity can
feasibly be achieved. Thus, by situating themeasurement where the behavior of in-
terest actually occurs, I can improve the study of how individuals’ self-constructed
media environments interact with their beliefs and actions.
Combining these measurement strategies with field experiments conducted in
naturalistic online environments, I am able to shed light on how longstanding con-
cerns in political science manifest themselves in the modern, fragmented media
landscape. I begin by confirming the need for new measurement approaches: As
many previous studies have suggested in other contexts, survey evidence of me-
dia exposure is plagued with overreporting and leads to inflated estimates of the
overall political news audience online. I then demonstrate two ways of resolving
this problem. Next, turning to social media, I (alongwith two graduate-student co-
authors) employ behavioral outcome measures to study the effectiveness of strate-
gies for mobilizing grassroots activists on Twitter. This set of experiments not only
shows how to encourage political participation in a new context, but it suggests
that network effects—in which subjects pass on campaign messages to their own
followers—can be more powerful than appeals from the original source. Finally,
applying some of the methods I introduce in the first paper, I conduct a test of the
partisan selective exposure hypothesis online.
The overarching theme of these papers is that, thanks to advances in both re-
search design and technology, many well-articulated concerns about the impact of
the Internet on politics and public life can nowbe subjected to rigorous scrutiny. As
I havedone here and continue to do inmyongoingwork, themost dire predictions—
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about people’s tendency to cocoon themselves into ideological echo chambers or
opt for low-cost “slacktivism” over more meaningful contributions to collective
action—appear to lack strong support. But it is also clear that results clearly de-
pend on the structural features of a particular medium: Twitter enables peer effects
and the mutual reinforcement of viewpoints, while the high-choice environment
of the Web may inherently lead to moderation. This dissertation strives to reorient
research on the Internet and politics toward a more nuanced appreciation of the
interaction between political behavior, information, and media structure.
Below, I summarize each paper in turn.
Paper 1
My first dissertation paper is an introduction and validation of the technique I pro-
pose for producing behavioralmeasures of individuals’ online exposure to political
media. Via a series of experiments, I show that survey-based self-report methods
lead to substantial overreporting of exposure to individual online media sources
(including both large sites such as CNN.com and smaller, partisan outlets). How-
ever, questions inwhich respondents are asked to list the sites they visit in an open-
ended format produce the least amount of overreporting. Still, if possible to obtain,
behavioral measures are clearly preferable for measuring exposure. I demonstrate
two methods for doing so: indirectly, by taking advantage of the way that web
browsers display visited and unvisited links, and directly, by asking subjects to in-
stall a piece of software that scans their web histories against a fixed list of political
sites.
Abstract
Self-reported measures of media exposure are plagued with error and questions
about validity. Since they are essential to studying media effects, a substantial
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literature has explored the shortcomings of these measures, tested proxies, and
proposed refinements. But lacking an objective baseline, such investigations can
only make relative comparisons. By focusing specifically on recent Internet activ-
ity stored by web browsers, this paper’s methodology captures individuals’ actual
consumption of political media. Using experiments embedded within an online
survey, I test three different measures of media exposure and compare them to the
actual exposure. I find that open-ended survey prompts reduce overreporting and
generate an accurate picture of the overall audience for online news. I also show
that they predict news recall at least as well as general knowledge. Together, these
results demonstrate that some ways of asking questions about media use are better
than others. I conclude with a discussion of survey-based exposure measures for
online political information and the applicability of this paper’s direct method of
exposure measurement for future studies.
Paper 2
For the second dissertation paper, we designed and implemented field experiments
on the social network Twitter to study the effects of different online mobilization
strategies. Aside fromproducing novel results on the relative effectiveness of tweets
and private direct messages, we also developed innovative design enhancements
that allowed us to avoid the many pitfalls of experimenting over a public network.
Abstract
This study rigorously compares the effectiveness of online mobilization appeals
via two randomized field experiments conducted over the social microblogging
service Twitter. In the process, we demonstrate a methodological innovation de-
signed to capture social effects by exogenously inducing network behavior. In both
experiments, we find that direct, private messages to followers of a nonprofit ad-
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vocacy organization’s Twitter account are highly effective at increasing support for
an online petition. Surprisingly, public tweets have no effect at all. We additionally
randomize the private messages to prime subjects with either a “follower” or an
“organizer” identity but find no evidence that this affects the likelihood of sign-
ing the petition. Finally, in the second experiment, followers of subjects induced to
tweet a link to the petition are more likely to sign it—evidence of a campaign gone
“viral.” In presenting these results, we contribute to a nascent body of experimen-
tal literature exploring political behavior in online social media.
Paper 3
My thirddissertation paper applies themeasurement approach of the first by leveraging—
for the first time—data on the actual browsing behavior of an online panel of re-
spondents maintained by the survey research firm YouGov. In the first place, this
approach allows me to demonstrate the power of direct behavioral measures of
media exposure on a larger sample. Then, in a companion study, I deploy two on-
line field experiments exploring subjects’ open-ended search strategies for learning
about political topics. In addition to overcoming the measurement problem, this
approach allows for valid causal inference on real-world outcomes—a major diffi-
culty for studies of media effects, online or not. Studying these processes online is
important for identifying how media choice and information interact in an era of
selective exposure.
Abstract
Despite decades of frequent hypothesizing and inconclusive testing, evidence for
partisan selective exposure remains elusive. Research on this venerable phenomenon
tends to be either observational (using behavioral measures of exposure) or exper-
imental (in which researchers manipulate the content of treatments in a laboratory
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setting). This study advances the literature on several fronts. First, I focus on Inter-
net media, already the dominant source of political information for younger Amer-
icans and quickly becoming so for the rest of the population. This has theoretical
implications for how a fragmented, high-choice environmentmoderates traditional
media effects. Second, in collaboration with an online polling firm, I collect unique
and unprecedented data tracking the real-time browsing behavior of a panel of In-
ternet survey respondents. Third, I supplement this observational portrait with
two online field-experimental studies to test the real-world behavior of smaller but
similar subject pools. In both studies, I employ a novel measurement strategy that
allows me to capture trace data on individuals’ actual consumption of political me-
dia. This allowsme to directly study how open-ended search strategies for political
information vary by partisan affiliation. In doing so, I uncover consistent evidence
of moderation rather than selective exposure. I also find mixed evidence on the




An Experimental Test of
Online Political Media Exposure
Survey-basedmeasures ofmedia exposure are notoriously imperfect. Respondents
tend to inflate their news consumption in self-reports, which can paint amisleading
picture of the overall news audience and bias estimates of regression parameters in
studies of media effects. Recent research has estimated that for network news, this
measurement error can overstate aggregate exposure by at least 200 percent (Prior
2009a).
Such problems, and persistent findings since the 1940s of “minimal effects” in
observational studies, once led some scholars to abandon the media-effects enter-
prise entirely (Lazarsfeld, Berelson andGaudet 1944; Graber 1997). Nearly 50 years
after the canonical studies of the Columbia School, Bartels described this state of af-
fairs as “one of the most notable embarrassments of modern social science” (1993).
Yet research on media effects continues. Since the pioneering experiments of
Iyengar and Kinder (1987), scholars have worked to identify how exposure to cam-
paign content or news coverage in the lab affects opinion change, candidate eval-
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uations, vote choice, and other outcomes. Others have since studied these effects
in the field (e.g., Gerber et al. 2011). But even though researchers in such designs
control the content and timing of treatments, measuring subjects’ exposure can still
be necessary for the analysis—for example, to estimate complier average causal ef-
fects (CACE). At the same time, survey-based measures, in overcoming problems
of external validity, remain a vital tool for disentangling the role of the media in
real-world studies of political behavior.
Thus far, efforts to validate existing survey-based measures have suffered from
a persistent problem: lacking a measure of true exposure (e.g., Prior 2009b; Ro-
mantan et al. 2008). I address this shortcoming by demonstrating the usefulness of
a simple yet powerful new method of recovering subjects’ actual history of expo-
sure. The approach necessitates a shift in focus from the more traditional domain
of television and newspapers to the Internet. In so doing, this paper provides the
first evidence of the accuracy of measures designed specifically to capture online
political news consumption.
Such measures will only increase in importance as more Americans use the In-
ternet as their primary source for news and information about the political world.
A recent Pew report found that 39% of respondents went online or used a mobile
device to catch up on news “yesterday,” and this proportion increased to 50%when
social networks, email, and podcasts were included (Pew 2012). Given continuing
generational gaps in news consumption habits, online sources will likely overtake
more traditional media in the near future. But so far, the literature on media expo-
sure has lagged behind.
The measure of actual exposure is constructed from subjects’ browsing history.
Web browsers, such as Firefox and Google Chrome, continually collect information
onwhich pages users visit andwhen they do so. These are saved locally and remain
secure. However, it is possible with users’ permission to obtain data on which of a
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predetermined list of sites has been visited within a given period of time. This can
be matched to specific question wordings in surveys. In this paper, I demonstrate
how to generate the data both indirectly and directly: first by taking advantage of
how browsers display visited and unvisited links to users, and second by using a
browser plug-in that collects the information automatically.
I find that among the three self-reported measures of media exposure tested,
asking respondents to list the websites they have visited to learn about politics in
an open-ended format produces the best results. In the aggregate, open-ended
questions recover an accurate picture of the overall online audience for news, and
at the individual level they cause substantially less overreporting. I also show
in a validation exercise that exposure measures constructed from open-ended re-
sponses predict the reception of recent political news stories better than general
political knowledge. However, there is still a worrying level of absolute misreport-
ing across all question types, reinforcing the arguments of some scholars that direct
measures—such as the one demonstrated in this paper—should be usedwhen pos-
sible for studying individuals’ political behavior. However, the open-ended survey
measure appears suitable for use in capturing aggregate exposure.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review the critiques of existing
exposure measures and discuss the special challenges of studying online media.
Second, I outline three distinct experimental designs intended to test and bench-
mark the survey-based measures of online media exposure. Third, I present basic
results comparing the performance of the measures against each other and against
the true measure on several different metrics. Fourth, I analyze characteristics of
both individuals and sites that predict misreporting in surveys. Fifth, I test the
survey-based exposure measures against a measure of general political knowledge
in predicting news recall. A final section then concludes with a discussion of how




Scholars have proposed a number of workarounds to improve existing exposure
measures. One class of solutions aims to incentivize accuracy among respondents,
either by offering them money or giving them more time (Prior and Lupia 2008).
Another attempts to anchor respondents’ expectations by providing themwith ba-
sic population-level summaries of behavioral frequencies, such as how often most
Americans watch network news broadcasts (Burton and Blair 1991; Prior 2009b).
These proposed solutionsmaynot be reliable, however, and reporting population-
level data requires this information to be known in advance. Especially in the case
of questions probing subjects’ new-media consumption habits, this may not always
be the case, or at least the population frequencies in questionmay not be stable over
time.
Other scholars have concluded that substitutes should be used instead. Most
prominently, Price and Zaller (1993) have proposed and validated general political
knowledge questions as a proxy for news media exposure. However, as Althaus
and Tewksbury (2007) note in their report on media use measures in the American
National Election Studies (ANES), such knowledge questions must be periodically
aligned with contemporary realities and thus may make longitudinal comparisons
difficult.
The final approach is to forego exposure measures entirely in favor of direct
behavioral measures. A notable recent attempt to do so relied on a mobile phone-
based ambient recording system deployed by amedia research firm in Chicago and
New York (LaCour 2013). By matching digital audio signatures with actual broad-
casts in subjects’ mediamarkets, the innovative study design enabled the collection
of accurate, continuously updated records of exposure to specific programs on tele-
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vision and radio. Unfortunately, the likelihood of another such study in the near
future is low: Issues of cost aside, the company, Integrated Media Measurement
Incorporated, has been acquired and its study discontinued.
In sum, while the problems of relying on self-reports are manifest and well-
known, the proposed alternatives have shortcomings of their own. Improving on
existing measures should continue to be a priority, with special attention to the
shifting media landscape in which studies are being conducted.
Survey-Based Measures of Online Media Exposure
Oneof themain recommendations ofAlthaus andTewksbury’s report for theANES
is to adapt existing measures to more closely match respondents’ experiences with
newer forms of media. Such efforts will have to address the challenges discussed
by Mutz and Young (2011, 1023-1024) in their recent survey of public opinion and
communication research:
Indeed, asking the average citizen whether he or she watches, reads,
or listens to “news” these days is the classic example of a bad survey
question because the very definition of what constitutes “news” is in
flux. Because scholars have yet to come to grips with all of these recent
changes, we know little about where people are getting their exposure
to political information and argument, and whether the source makes
any difference.
An important feature of the online news environment that differs markedly
from the traditional realms of television, radio, and newspapers is the sheer quan-
tity of available sources. The Internet offers potentially thousands of avenues for
learning about the political developments of the day, from mainstream news sites
and aggregation portals to blogs and other online publications targeted to narrower
audiences. A corollary to this proliferation of sources is that outlets often cater to
a specific range of the ideological spectrum (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005).
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But if the number of potential sources of exposure presents an additional diffi-
culty to the measurement task, the way people interact with political news online
may actually make it easier. The bulk of Internet news consumers primarily visit
a small handful of mainstream websites—many but not all of which are associ-
ated with established newspapers or cable channels (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011;
Hindman 2008). Moreover, while TV viewership may be considered at least in part
a passive activity, accessing political information online is a more purposeful ac-
tivity that might lead to more accurate recall (Mutz and Young 2011).
Given these attributes of the online media environment, the studies presented
here allow for awide range of specific online sources to bemeasuredwhile focusing
as much as possible on subjects’ deliberate—as opposed to incidental—exposure
to political content.
Types of Survey Questions
Based on a review of the survey response and media exposure literatures, I have
identified three different types of questions that can be adapted for capturing online
media habits for political news.
First, check-all questions allow respondents to check off any number of options
from a given list of information sources, from none to all. This is a common format:
For example, the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), in its 2008 online
panel, allowed multiple selections from lists in its exposure questions on televi-
sion. Dilliplane, Goldman and Mutz (2013) validate this “program list technique”
as a measure for exposure to political information on television. The ANES also
adopted versions of this question format in its 2012 Evaluations of Government
and Society Study and pre-election questionnaire.
Second, open-ended questions allow respondents to give their answers with-
out restrictions on length or the choice set (Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz 1996,
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225). The Pew Research Center has used this format in its Internet & American Life
Project surveys; its 2010 post-election survey asked respondents which web sites
they used for campaign and election news, coding up to three responses.
And third, forced-choice, yes/no questions (Smyth et al. 2006) require respon-
dents to choose either “Yes” or “No” to each question in a sequence, in this case
a list of online political news sources. “Don’t Know” and not answering are not
options with this type of question.
Given these questions, I derived and pre-registered (Humphreys, Sanchez de la
Sierra and van der Windt 2013)1 two hypotheses on their relative performance as
benchmarked against the measure of true exposure, which is described further in
the next section.
First, Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz (1996) argue that open-ended questions
are useful for self-reporting of behavioral frequencies, an application closely related
to themeasurement of media exposure (especially frequentmedia exposure, as it is
often framed in question wording). One advantage of this type of question is that
since respondents are not presented with a pre-selected list of choices, it reduces
errors in judgment caused by the familiarity of a given item: “Reliance on accessi-
bility or familiarity, however, also leaves a respondent open to error. Although true
frequency can increase familiarity, so can factors like ease of perceiving an item,
expectation induced by context, and probably many other variables” (Tourangeau,
Rips and Rasinski 2000, 142-143). This leads to my expectation that open-ended
prompts will counteract respondents’ tendency to overreport their exposure to on-
line political media as compared to the check-all format:
1Before analysis began, I uploaded a pre-registration document to my public academic website:
http://polisci.columbia.edu/files/polisci/u227/PreregistrationDesignDocumentGuess2013a.pdf
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H1: Open-Ended vs. Check-All
Respondents to open-ended prompts will be less likely to overreport their
exposure to online political media than respondents asked to select from
specific outlets in a list.
Unlike open-ended questions, both the forced-choice and check-all question
types present respondentswith a list of choices. However, the task faced by respon-
dents differs substantially. Check-all questions can encourage satisficing (Krosnick
1991): respondents can leave all items unchecked or select only the first option
they can justify. But forced-choice questions require a response one way or an-
other for each item, which should make satisficing harder (Sudman and Bradburn
2012). It should also result in more “Yes” responses, “both because respondents
process throughout the list and because they more deeply process each individual
response option, making them more likely to think of reasons the options apply”
(Smyth et al. 2006):
H2: Forced-Choice vs. Check-All
Respondents to a successive series of forced-choice, yes-no prompts will
be more likely to overreport their exposure to online political media than
respondents asked to select from specific outlets in a list.
Research Design and Data
To test these hypotheses, and to more generally determine the accuracy of these
three survey-based measures, I deployed a series of survey experiments on Ama-
zon.com’s Mechanical Turk online marketplace (MTurk).2 In addition to a pilot
study in 2012, the surveys were in the field in four separate batches from Novem-
ber 22, 2013 to January 11, 2014.
2TheMTurkR package by Leeper (2013) proved useful for this step.
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MTurk is an online marketplace for posting modular, low-cost “human intel-
ligence tasks” (HITs). Among other applications, it enables quick recruitment of
subjects comprising an opt-in online sample in many ways more representative
of the general population than samples found in published lab experiments. For
example, Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) found that while MTurk samples are
younger than other adult convenience samples, the subjects are older than those
found in convenience samples composed of students at college campuses.3
Data collected in this way can be susceptible to the weaknesses of crowdsourc-
ing in general, namely habitual users and “spammers” who race through surveys
or submitmeaningless responses. For this paper, I took two steps to reduce the pos-
sibility of data contamination. First, at the front end, participation was restricted to
registered users who are residents of the United States, age 18 or older, and whose
approval rate (as determined by task requesters) for completing HITs was 95% or
greater. Second, I included a “screener” question at the beginning of the survey to
induce attentiveness. Following one of the recommendations of Berinsky, Margolis
and Sances (2013), respondents could only continue with the survey after success-
fully completing the screener question. Since the authors found that “shirkers”
differ from other respondents in meaningful ways, I opted for this “training” ap-
proach and did not drop any respondents.4
In the survey experiments, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the
3MTurk non-probability samples are decidedly skewed along several dimensions. Using a na-
tionally representative face-to-face survey as a benchmark (the 2008 ANES), Berinsky, Huber and
Lenz (2012) reported that in their investigation, MTurk respondents were more likely to be female
(60.1% versus 54.9%), better educated, have lower income, and be white (95% versus 86.8%). Sub-
jects recruited byMTurk are also far less likely to be religious (41.8% said they have no religion, com-
pared to 20.1% in the ANES) or married (39% versus 50.1%), somewhat more liberal or Democratic-
leaning, and less interested in politics.
4The screener question asked respondents for their favorite color, but only those who read all of
the text saw the following instructions: “To demonstrate that you’ve read this much, just go ahead
and select both red and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is.
Yes, ignore the question below and select both of those options” (see Berinsky, Margolis and Sances
2013). An error message was displayed until respondents correctly answered the question, after
which they were allowed to continue.
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three question types for measuring online media exposure. The questions were
designed to hold as much as possible constant between conditions, including the
available choices and the time period respondents were asked to think about (30
days). Question wordings were as follows.5
Check-all condition. This question, adapted from Annenberg, read: “Which of
these websites have you visited or used in the past 30 days for news, if any? Select
ALL answers that apply.” Respondents were shown a list of 27 sites, including the
main network and cable news homepages, news websites such as NYTimes.com,
niche sites such as Politico, and a balanced selection of smaller partisan websites.
Respondents were also given the option to check “Other (please specify),” which
included a text box.
Open-ended condition. Subjects were given a large blank text box with the fol-
lowing instructions: “Please list any websites or blogs that you have visited in the
past 30 days for news. Take some time to ensure that you think of all the sites
you have visited.” Respondents were encouraged to “take some time” and “think”
about all the online sources they have visited in order to coax a full response in the
absence of pre-selected choices. (The word “blogs” was also added to ensure that
subjects did not skew their responses toward large or mainstream news sites.)
Forced-choice condition. Respondentswere shownanordered list ofwebsites—
the same as in the check-all condition—with the choices of “Yes” and “No” given
next to each and the question “Have you visited this site?” Above the list was this
sentence: “Which of these websites have you visited or used in the past 30 days for
news, if any?”
To determine the list of choices given to respondents in the first and third con-
ditions, sites were first selected on the basis of total visits as determined by a pilot
administered in the summer of 2012. This was then augmented to ensure that sites
5See Appendix A1 for full wordings and available responses for all three questions.
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for the major cable and network news organizations, newspapers, and large online
portals (AOL, Yahoo!) were covered. Finally, a balanced selection of sites for parti-
san and nonpartisan political enthusiasts was added (e.g., ThinkProgress, Politico,
Drudge Report).6
Study 1: The Link Classification Technique
In Study 1, respondents were asked to complete a Link Classification Task after an-
swering one of the randomly assigned survey questions. This task allowed for the
creation of the measure of actual online media exposure.
To do this, I presented subjects with an extended list of “masked” URLs of po-
litical news sites and blogs. Each link was displayed with exactly the same generic
text, indicating nothing about the identity or content of the corresponding URL.
Web browsers display visited and unvisited links in different colors; the survey
exploited this feature by asking all respondents to check off each line containing
a link displayed as visited (i.e., purple in most cases) by their browsers. Subjects
were told that the “linked websites are all related to political news.”
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, respondents saw a long page filled with hyperlinks
labeled solely with the word “LINK”—a sea of purple and blue. To the left of each
line on the page, there was a single check box. Following the instructions, any
line containing a purple (“visited”) link was to be checked. In this way, the survey
collected a snapshot of subjects’ recent browser history for those specific sites.
The list of sites included in the Link Classification Task—and thus the universe
of sources with which the survey-based measures can be benchmarked—was as-
sembled as follows.7 First, adapting a strategy used by Gentzkow and Shapiro
6The social link aggregator Redditwas also includedwith the expectation that the site is popular
among respondents recruited via MTurk.
7See Appendix A2 for a full list of the sites included. The order of the links displayed was
randomly shuffled for each respondent.
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Figure 1.1: A screen shot of how the Link Classification Task looked to survey re-
spondents. Visited links were purple, and unvisited links were blue.
(2011), I obtained comScore data on total unique visitors per month to U.S. web-
sites, averaged from July to August 2013 for users at home and at work. I first took
all sites with at least 300 unique visitors per month on average in the “General
News” category and all sites with at least 50 unique visitors per month on aver-
age in the “Politics” category (which was smaller). I then added any sites in the
larger “News/Information” category with at least 1,500 unique visitors that were
not already included. Next, I winnowed down this list by removing sites that were
primarily local in focus, non-news-related, or not based in the U.S. (with the excep-
tion of sites like BBC and The Guardian that cover American politics extensively). I
ensured that the sites of the top 10 newspapers by total average circulation (both
print and digital as of March 2013, according to the Alliance for Audited Media)
were included. Finally, I crawled several directories of partisan political blogs to
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complete the list.8
The final result was a list of 155 links, along with a limited number of variations
to ensure that the sites were properly captured by the technique.9 Each line of
the Link Classification Task consists of one to three separate URLs pointing to the
same site. URLs were coded to point to main pages in order to capture purposeful
behavior rather than incidental visits to specific pages.
This method of constructing the true measure of online media exposure relies
on the assumption that subjects, when presented with generically labeled hyper-
links to sites on the Internet, will truthfully distinguish between those marked as
visited and those marked as unvisited by their browser software. This assumption
is plausible since the task, divorced from any substantive context involving politics
or media, is mechanical and straightforward. However, it does need to be tested.
A validity check using hard-coded color displays demonstrated that themethod
is generally accurate. In Study 1, a fourth treatment condition randomly presented
any of the three survey questions, followed by a version of the Link Classification
Task in which all the link colors were fixed in advance unbeknownst to subjects.
Thus, there was a predetermined “correct” distribution of responses. Figure 1.2
illustrates Study 1’s design.
I randomly selected five of the 155 links to be hard-coded as visited.10 The pro-
portion of the 132 subjects in the validity condition who correctly marked each
visited link ranges from 89.4% to 97%, with an average of 95% accuracy. The low
8I used the following listings as additional sources for sites to include: the top 25 in Alexa’s
Politics > News and Media and News > Weblogs categories; Evan Carmichael’s Top 50 Po-
litical Blogs of 2009; Rightwing News’ 100 Most Popular Conservative Websites for 2013; The
Free Republic’s Top 100 Conservative Political Websites of 2007; and the List of Political Blogs
(http://politicalbloglistings.blogspot.com).
9For example, a user might visit Yahoo! by typing either “www.yahoo.com” or “yahoo.com”;
both versions were included for sites where applicable.
10This sparseness was by design: In the 2012 pilot, themean number of sites checked as “visited”
was 3.4.
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Figure 1.2: Survey flow for Study 1. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatment
conditions 1-4.
end of the range corresponds to the fact that I marked the second but not the first
of two links in row 93 as visited. The high end of the range corresponds to the pur-
ple link in the first row, consistent with satisficing. The proportion of subjects who
correctly left each unvisited link unmarked ranges from 99.2% (in only two cases)
to 100% (in the other 148 cases). Overall, this test verifies that the method of asking
subjects to manually check visited (i.e. purple) links provides an accurate measure
of browsing history.
Study 2: Browser Widget
In Study 2, the Link Classification Task was replaced with an automated method
of collecting the same information: a software plug-in for Google Chrome web
browsers. The other change fromStudy 1was that therewere only three conditions,
one for each survey question type; the validity condition was not needed in this
20
design.
Since Chrome has powerful capabilities for querying users’ web histories nec-
essary for this kind of application, I only allowed subjects using that browser to
enter the study.11 Google Chrome is currently the second most widely used web
browser in the United States, behind Microsoft Internet Explorer.12 But among the
MTurk respondent pool, Chrome is by far the most popular: 62.9% of respondents
in Study 1 used the browser to take the survey.
I implemented the design by asking respondents at the end of the survey to
follow a link to install the browser extension. Since requiring workers to install
software was a violation of MTurk policies when the study was conducted, this
step was left as optional for bonus credit. In the final step of the survey, respon-
dents were given a unique identifier code and told to run the extension by clicking
the button added to their browser’s toolbar. When this was done, a small win-
dow appeared asking for the code. Once users submitted the code, the plug-in
immediately scanned their web history, encoded the data, and sent it to the survey
database. Subjects were encouraged to uninstall the extension once it finished.
The advantages of this approach are considerable: If the browser extension is
installed and run properly, there will be no measurement error in retrieving a sub-
ject’s exposure data. Perhaps even more attractive is the ability to precisely control
the time period for which the browser history is queried. The Link Classification
Method is susceptible to variations in the frequency with which subjects clear their
browser histories, which could range from daily to never. With the browser exten-
sion, both the software and the survey questions were calibrated to the same time
period—the past 30 days.
11The browser extension was written in JavaScript using the Google Chrome API. Munson, Lee
and Resnick (2013) used a similar approach in a recent study of media slant in users’ online reading
habits.
1229.99% of users compared to 37.5% for IE, according to StatCounter web analytics for January-
December 2013. Source: http://gs.statcounter.com/#browser-US-monthly-201301-201312-bar
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A final advantage of this approach is that the software can be adjusted for dif-
ferent search criteria. In the present design, the code was written to capture in-
tentional behavior: For instance, a visit to a specific page on NYTimes.com but not
the main page itself was not counted as exposure. This most closely matches the
way exposure history was captured in the Link Classification Task. However, future
designs could easily change this rule and incorporate any number of permissible
URL variations via regular expressions.
From the respondent’s perspective, the process is likely less tedious and time-
consuming than scrolling through a list of 155 links. However, there are some
downsides. First, some users may feel uncomfortable with installing third-party
software that accesses their web history. I addressed this issue bymaking clear that
the plug-in only searches against a fixed list of sites (identical to the one used for
the Link Classification Task) which respondents could view before continuing. Sec-
ond, and relatedly, this method necessarily cut down the subject pool. In addition
to non-Chrome users, survey respondents who did not wish to install a browser
extension were dropped from the analysis.
As a result, the effective response rate for this design was 14.6%, for a final sam-
ple size of 85 (check-all condition: N=30; open-ended condition: N=21; forced-
choice condition: N=34). Although this attrition raises the possibility of bias, I
show in Appendix A4 that demographic and political characteristics of the respon-
dents were comparable between the full sample and the subset that installed the
browser extension.
Study 3: Testing News Recall
While the previous twodesigns focused on accuracy, Study 3was intended to inves-
tigate how well the survey-based exposure measures predict news recall as com-
pared to a measure of general political knowledge (Price and Zaller 1993), thus
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serving as an important test of validity.
Like Study 2, Study 3 kept only the three main treatment conditions. The other
difference was the inclusion of three questions testing the recall of recent political
news stories. These were modeled on a series of questions included in the 1989
ANES Pilot Study and analyzed by Price and Zaller (1993) in their original valida-
tion of general knowledge questions as proxies for news reception.
The wordings were as follows, each beginning with a yes-or-no question and
followed by an open-ended question which was then coded:
1. “Do you remember any recent stories about a new policy in Colorado taking
effect on Jan. 1, 2014? [If yes:] Do you recall what that policy involves?”13
2. “Have you seen or heard any news stories about the Duck Dynasty star Phil
Robertson? [If yes:] Do you know why he was recently in the news?”14
3. “Do you remember hearing about certain federal government benefits that
expired at the end of 2013? [If yes:] Do you recall what kind of benefits they
were?”15
The general knowledge questions were included in all versions of the design.16
Measures
In the analyses that follow, I make use of several measures of accuracy. I construct
measures capturing individuals’ tendency to overreport, underreport, and misre-
13Correct answer: legalization of marijuana for recreational use
14Correct answer: inflammatory comments about gays and African Americans
15Correct answer: expiration of Emergency Unemployment Compensation program
16I asked four questions: (1) “Who is the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court?”; (2) “For how
many years is a United States senator elected – that is, how many years are there in one full term of
office for a U.S. senator?” (open-ended); (3) “Who is the Speaker of the House of Representatives?”;
(4) “On which of the following does the U.S. federal government spend the least money?” with
available choices of foreign aid (the correct answer), Medicare, national defense, and Social Security.
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port true exposure in either direction. Table 1.1 summarizes how each measure is
constructed.
Exposure Data Measures
Actual Reported Overreporting Underreporting Misreporting
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0
Table 1.1: Overview of the accuracymeasures used in the analysis. For a given indi-
vidual, each line represents one of the possible combinations of actual and reported
exposure to a site.
To code responses to the open-ended question, I first examined the results, in-
ductively generating a running list ofmentionedwebsites (alongwith spelling vari-
ations) included in the Link Classification Task. I separately collected common short-
hand designations for various sites in the list. Then, I coded exposure by iteratively
running text searches for the resulting strings (disregarding case).
For each respondent, these measures are summed over all the possible websites
they could have reported visiting given the treatment condition (27 for the check-all
and forced-choice conditions, 155 for the open-ended prompt). Thus, in the table
above, the measures of overreporting, underreporting, and misreporting would be
created by summing down the rows. In the same way, I also generated raw counts
of individuals’ total number of actual and reported site visits.
Finally, at the site level, I created measures of total visits (both actual and re-
ported) per site across all respondents in a given condition.
Results
For the main results using the Link Classification Task, I pool across Studies 1 and 3,
keeping observations from treatment groups 1-3 (N= 1,112). For these observations
24
the design is identical.17
The total number of visits per site across all conditions—according to the mea-
sure of actual exposure—tracks the findings of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011), who
showed that the bulk of traffic to online political news sites is taken up by a rel-
ative few mainstream outlets.18 While this would never be true in a represen-
tative sample, Reddit, a social news aggregator, was by far the most visited site
among the MTurk respondents, with 558 total visits.19 The next-most-visited site
was CNN.com, with 293 visitors in the sample, followed by The Huffington Post
with 146 and Buzzfeed with 131. The counts drop off fairly quickly, leaving a “long
tail” of smaller, more narrowly targeted outlets such as Politico (37) and Talking
Points Memo (14).
Figure 1.3 breaks down these total counts by treatment condition, showing both
actual and reported exposure to online news sources summed across respondents.
The left graph shows reported versus actual exposure for those assigned to the
open-ended prompt. There does not seem to be an obvious pattern of either over-
or underreporting exposure, at least in the aggregate. The middle graph focuses
on the check-all question, which seems to induce some amount of overreporting
in general. The same is true of the forced-choice, yes/no question as shown on
the right, which displays at least as much overreporting as the check-all question.
Moreover, as the 95% confidence intervals around the Loess curves illustrate, the
counts of reported and actual exposure in the open-ended condition are statistically
indistinguishable from each other. This is not the case in the check-all and yes/no
conditions, illustrating a general tendency toward overreporting.20
17Balance checks and summary statistics are reported in Table A1 of Appendix A3.
18These descriptive findings are shown in Figure A1 of Appendix A3.
19That there is substantial overlap between the Reddit andMTurk communities will not surprise
anyone who has spent time in either one.
20Figure A2 in Appendix A3 plots the differences between the actual and reported counts for all
three conditions on the same graph.
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Overall, the yes/no question seems to induce somewhat more overreporting on
average. One peculiarity of these graphs is that Yahoo! News, Google News, and
The Huffington Post exhibit a fair degree of overreporting in all three conditions.
This is possibly because some respondents visited individual article pages rather
than the main page but still counted this as exposure, an artifact of the Link Classi-
fication Task design.21
21Conversely, in a pilot version of this study, YouTube was the most visited site according to
the Link Classification Task yet was rarely reported as a news source. Since this likely reflected re-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Such idiosyncrasies raise the possibility that site-level characteristics systemat-
ically promote over- or underreporting. In Appendix A5, I explore whether a site’s
overall audience or partisan leaning (as measured by comScore data) have an effect
on self-reported exposure. I find some evidence that audience size, but not partisan
lean, is associated with overreporting.
Next, I report the site-level totals from Study 2, which used the browser exten-
sion in place of the Link Classification Task, in Figure 1.4. The results are striking: The
same general pattern holds as in Figure 1.3. The measure of exposure from open-
ended responses yields totals that are statistically indistinguishable from those of
the direct measure (left panel), while both the check-all and yes/no questions gen-
erate overreporting. While it is unclear whether the latter causes even more over-
reporting, it does seem to produce the most variability in reported exposure. As
in Studies 1 and 3, there is less noise in the actual measure of exposure than in the
self-reported measures—in other words, error seems to be reduced regardless of
whether link classification or the browser software was used to collect the data.
Individual Determinants of Misreporting
Despite the aggregate site-level results reported above, it is possible that they ob-
scure important effects on the individual level. For example, does the open-ended
prompt produce a more accurate overall picture of online news exposure because
respondents are induced to report more accurately about all sources? Or is it per-
haps because the question causes respondents to misreport in two different direc-
tions that cancel out?
To investigate, I report regressions in Table 1.2 modeling the determinants of
individuals’ propensity to overreport, underreport, and misreport exposure to on-
line media. In all models, the check-all condition is the base case. To facilitate ease
of interpretation, I use OLS with Huber-White robust standard errors to report the
29
Table 1.2: OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses (N=1112).
Dependent variable:
Overreporting Underreporting Misreporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Open-Ended −1.61∗∗∗ −1.53∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ −0.14 −0.11
(0.17) (0.17) (0.38) (0.37) (0.41) (0.39)
Yes/no 1.82∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 1.82∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.26) (0.13) (0.15) (0.28) (0.28)
Age −0.01 0.01 −0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Hawaii/Pacific 1.34 0.84∗∗ 2.19
(1.55) (0.38) (1.54)
Other Race 0.52 −1.58 −1.06
(0.57) (1.40) (1.47)
Native −2.54∗∗∗ −2.42 −4.96∗∗
(0.76) (1.98) (2.08)
Black 0.66∗ −0.01 0.65
(0.34) (0.33) (0.44)
Asian −0.28 0.12 −0.16
(0.32) (0.27) (0.40)
Hispanic −0.65∗ 2.22 1.57
(0.34) (2.03) (2.03)
Female −0.23 0.08 −0.15
(0.19) (0.25) (0.30)
Income −0.01 0.07 0.06
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Education 0.10 0.24∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.07) (0.12) (0.14)
Ideology −0.07∗∗ −0.01 −0.07∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Party ID 0.02 0.10 0.11
(0.07) (0.15) (0.16)
Knowledge 0.42∗∗∗ 0.10 0.51∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.14) (0.16)
Attention −0.08 −0.001 −0.08
(0.07) (0.01) (0.08)
Computer −0.36 0.39∗ 0.03
(0.24) (0.23) (0.31)
Cleared 0.99∗∗∗ −0.37 0.63∗∗
(0.20) (0.24) (0.30)
Purple 0.63∗∗∗ −0.51 0.12
(0.23) (0.59) (0.62)
Constant 3.33∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ −1.43 3.97∗∗∗ 0.89
(0.15) (0.58) (0.08) (1.17) (0.16) (1.29)
Adj. R2 0.17 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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findings.22
I include dummies for the treatment conditions, in addition to a full range of
demographic and political controls. Knowledge was constructed using the ques-
tions testing general political knowledge, and is coded from 0-4. Attention was an
attempt to measure respondents’ interest in politics and attention devoted to polit-
ical news online.23 I also include several variables that attempt to correct for any
technological issues that could have inadvertently caused measurement error with
the Link Classification Task. Computer is a dummy variable for subjects’ response
to the question, “Are you completing this survey from the computer/web browser
combination you typically use to read news online, including about American poli-
tics?” This was intended to isolate the effect of respondents who reported exposure
to media that they used another computer or browsing device to access. Cleared is
a variable coded from the question, “Have you recently cleared the web history of
the browser you are currently using to complete this survey (i.e. within the last
30 days)?” This captures the possibility that some users will have nearly empty
web histories that could skew the actual exposure measure. And finally, Purple
coded respondents’ open-ended comments at the end of the survey, where they
were asked if they encountered any problems with the survey such as not seeing
any purple links in the Link Classification Task. This was intended to capture any
other possible technological issues that could have caused the Link Classification
Task to fail.
Several results stand out. First, the onlymodelswith any real explanatory power
are those that predict overreporting. This makes sense since overreporting is the
22Table A2 in Appendix A3 shows the same results with both quasi-Poisson and negative bino-
mial models as robustness checks since the dependent variable is overdispersed count data. All
substantive effects discussed in the text also hold in both models, while additional significant find-
ings are not consistent between the models.
23“How interested are you in information about what’s going on in government and politics?”
and “When you watch or read news on the Internet, how much attention do you usually pay to
news about politics?”
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most well-known problem with self-reported exposure measures. As expected,
and confirming both preregistered hypotheses, the open-ended condition causes
significantly less overreporting than the check-all question, and the yes/no ques-
tion causes more. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient on the open-ended con-
dition, −1.53, implies that the absolute level of overreporting (2.33 additional sites
on average for the check-all condition) is reduced by two-thirds. The yes/no con-
dition, by contrast, increases overreporting by an even greater magnitude. Models
3 and 4 suggest that open-ended questions also encourage more underreporting,
which also makes sense given the cost of recall. This is also a likely reason why the
open-ended question, despite significantly less overreporting, does not perform
any better than the check-all question when it comes to misreporting in general.
It appears that a number of respondents had either recently cleared their browser
histories or experienced some trouble displaying the colored links. In particular,
those with recently cleared histories were far more likely to “overreport,” although
that result is an artifact of measure construction—the actual exposure for these re-
spondents was artificially low.
A few demographic characteristics stand out as significant explanatory factors.
Echoing a well-known finding in self-reports of voting (Belli, Traugott and Beck-
mann 2001), respondents who were more knowledgeable about politics were more
likely to overreport. In addition, respondents with more education were more
likely to misreport exposure, a finding that seems to be driven more by under-
reporting. Finally, more conservative respondents were less likely to overreport
exposure than more liberal respondents.
Predicting News Reception
If a particular measure of media exposure is to be useful beyond a mere account-
ing of “who visited what website when,” it should be able to predict respondents’
32
ability to report political events discussed in the news. In a classic treatment of
news reception, Price and Zaller (1993) propose and validate general knowledge
as a predictor of news recall, arguing that it performs better as an “indicator of a
general propensity for learning about news events” (138). In Study 3 (N=700), I
incorporated questions about recent “news events,” structured in the same fashion
as the questions examined in the original paper. This allowed me to investigate
whether any of the particular survey-based measures perform as well as, or better
than, general knowledge.




















































































Figure 1.5: News recall broken down by individual story and predictor. The x-axis
plots, from left to right, general knowledge, reported media exposure, and actual
media exposure as measured by the Link Classification Task. The Colorado story is
in green, the Duck Dynasty story is in pink, and the unemployment benefits story
is in brown.
The three events I asked about—Colorado’s legalization of recreational mari-
juana, Duck Dynasty star Phil Robertson’s controversial remarks about gays and
AfricanAmericans, and the expiration of extendedunemployment benefits—varied
in terms of their overall resonance. To illustrate how general knowledge, reported
media exposure, and actual media exposure relate to how well respondents were
able to recall these stories, I recreated Figure 1 from Price and Zaller’s article in Fig-
ure 1.5 above. The x-axes show the level of general knowledge, reported exposure,
and actual exposure; for the latter two, I summed across sites for each respondent
and recoded the variables to be on the same scale as knowledge, from 0 to 4. The y-
33
axes plot the percentage of respondents in each categorywhowere able to correctly
answer the question about each story.




















































































































































































Figure 1.6: News recall (composite measure) broken down by predictor. The x-
axis plots, from left to right, general knowledge, reported media exposure, and
actual media exposure as measured by the Link Classification Task. The y-axis plots
the average number of stories recalled, out of 3. Each row represents a different
treatment condition.
The predictive power of general knowledge is clear: As knowledge increases
(from 0 to 4), the percentage of respondents who recall the marijuana story in-
creases from nearly 52% to nearly 75%, and the percentage who recall the Duck
Dynasty story increases from 48% to 74%. The unemployment issue is less well
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known, but recall of that story increases as well, from under 19% to over half. Re-
ported media use also shows a clear association with recall, especially with the
marijuana story, but the relationship is not monotonic. Moreover, forDuck Dynasty
there is no positive association at all. Meanwhile, the tally of actual media use has
a positive but more modest association with news recall.
To investigate the performance of the exposure measures, I first created an in-
dex of overall news reception by summing up the indicators for each news story.
Figure 1.6 plots this index against the same predictors, with each treatment group
on a different row.24 From this picture, reported open-ended exposure (top mid-
dle graph) clearly shows the strongest association with news recall—stronger than
either general knowledge or actual use. Table 1.3 regresses this index on total re-
ported exposure and general political knowledge separately within each treatment
group. In the middle column, the coefficient on Exposure is statistically significant
and larger than that forKnowledge: For respondents randomly assigned to the open-
ended prompt, the total number of websites they reported being exposed to pre-
dicts news reception over and above the level of general political knowledge. The
exposure measure in the check-all condition is also significant, but its effect is more
modest. Also notable is that for those assigned to the open-ended group, the At-
tentionmeasure behaves as we would expect, reducing overall news reception.
Discussion
The results presented here will be of considerable use to scholars seeking to im-
prove research designs in both observational and experimental settings—especially
given that data collection online is increasingly popular for both practical and sub-
stantive reasons (Iyengar 2010). Taken together, the findings of the three studies
24Appendix A3 contains a version of this graph in Figure A3 with the recall measures for each
story kept separate.
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Table 1.3: OLS with Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.
DV = News reception (0-3)
Check-all Open-ended Yes/no
(1) (2) (3)
Exposure 0.05∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Knowledge 0.21∗∗∗ 0.01 0.14∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Attention −0.11 −0.14∗∗∗ −0.14∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07)








Black −0.52∗∗ −0.12 −0.03
(0.22) (0.34) (0.22)
Asian 0.15 −0.12 −0.18
(0.24) (0.19) (0.23)
Hispanic −0.31 −0.12 0.14
(0.19) (0.27) (0.30)
Female 0.12 0.13 −0.10
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Income −0.03 0.03 −0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Education 0.02 0.05 0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Ideology 0.05 −0.09∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.04) (0.04) (0.003)
Party ID 0.06 0.08∗ −0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Computer 0.30∗ 0.08 −0.47∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14)
Cleared −0.003 0.09 0.21∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Purple −0.22 0.04 0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Constant 0.67 1.45∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.37) (0.43)
N 216 253 231
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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converge on the conclusion that among survey-based measures of online media
exposure, open-ended questions perform the best. Evaluated against baselinemea-
sures of true exposure constructed in two different ways, they produce an accurate
snapshot of aggregate online media use. They also encourage significantly less
overreporting of exposure to specific websites, although this is partially balanced
out by more underreporting. As expected, forced-choice, yes/no questions cause
even more overreporting than check-all questions, and both result in an inflated
picture of the overall audience for online political media.
Holding actual exposure constant, the kinds of sources that tend to get reported
most are those with the greatest reach. This is likely both because those sources
are more likely to be listed as a choice to be selected in closed-ended questions and
because they are more likely to be easily retrieved from memory.
On the individual level, more knowledgeable respondents are more likely to
overreport exposure to political media, and there is some evidence that more con-
servative respondents are less likely to overreport. Without further research on a
representative sample, it is unclear whether these findings generalize to the popu-
lation, but they raise the possibility that there are demographic and political corre-
lates of misreporting behavior on surveys of media exposure.
In addition to performing better in terms of overreporting and aggregate expo-
sure, open-ended questions predict reception of recent political news stories better
than Price and Zaller’s knowledge measure, at least in the sample analyzed here.
In general, however, it is important to remember that the absolute level ofmisre-
porting is high, relative to overall exposure, regardless of the survey-basedmethod
used. Fortunately, the methods demonstrated here point a way forward. In appli-
cations where direct behavioral measures of Internet-based activity are needed,
online surveys can be equipped to present respondents with a version of the Link
Classification Task tailored to a particular universe of sites. As demonstrated in the
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validity test, this procedure generates nearly error-free data on actual online expo-
sure without the privacy concerns of a software extension. If deployed as part of
a representative sample online, the method could shed light on exactly what types
of people are more or less likely to report using a particular source.
Classifying links based on appearance is a relatively straightforward and un-
intrusive way of obtaining data on subjects’ online browsing behavior for a given
domain. Its main disadvantage is inconvenience to respondents (which increases
linearly with the number of URLs included in the list). In research designs where
using this procedure is infeasible, researchers have two options. First, they can opt
for survey-based measures: open-ended responses that are coded, analyzed, then
possibly adjusted for known biases documented in representative data. This is an
especially attractive option for studies not focusing entirely or at all on Internet-
based media, since open-ended queries are endlessly adaptable.
Second, researchers can consider using the browser extension method. While
Study 2 illustrated the tradeoff betweenmeasurement error and response rate with
this design in the survey context, it may be better suited for more controlled set-
tings. In laboratory experiments or computer-administered online surveys inwhich
researchers have some degree of control over the equipment, this may actually be
the least intrusive option. And most compellingly, this approach could be har-
nessed to tap into more refined measures of actual browsing behavior, such as log-
ging not just whether and when users have visited a given URL, but how many
times. This “dosage” measure would help separate substantively important habit-
ual media habits from one-off visits, which the current method cannot distinguish
between (Mutz and Young 2011).
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Chapter2
When Treatments Are Tweets:
A Network Mobilization Experiment
Over Twier
with Alexander Coppock and John Ternovski
While much enthusiasm about the Internet focuses on its ability to foster informal
and decentralized forms of organization (Shirky 2008; Benkler 2006; Bennett and
Segerberg 2012), traditional groups have long recognized its potential for recruit-
ment and mobilization (Obar, Zube and Lampe 2012). This is especially true in
the realm of politics: With meaningful political behavior now commonplace on-
line, campaigns have added email and Facebook appeals to their arsenal of tactics
(Krueger 2006; Gaby and Caren 2012). Nonpartisan and advocacy organizations
have similarly turned to social media to engage their supporters.
This study examines the effects of an online mobilization campaign via what
we believe to be the first randomized field experiments conducted on the social
network Twitter. Our design allows us to identify the effects of both private mes-
saging and “natural” network behavior directed toward supporters of a nonprofit
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advocacy organization, the League of Conservation Voters (LCV). The two field ex-
periments we present here follow nearly identical designs and lead us to draw very
similar conclusions about political mobilization over Twitter.
Our primarymanipulation in both experiments exposes some subjects to a pub-
lic tweet only and others to one of two private direct messages. The wording of the
direct messages primes subjects with one of two identities based on previous re-
search demonstrating the behavioral consequences of associating political actions
with a particular self-concept (Bryan et al. 2011). With this manipulation, we in-
vestigate whether the passivity associated with a “followers” label or the higher
level of commitment associated with an “organizers” label has an impact on our
two outcomes: signing an online petition and tweeting (or retweeting) the petition
link.
Our secondary manipulation encourages a random subset of petition signers to
tweet the petition to their own followers. This has the consequence of randomly
assigning the followers of petition signers to be exposed to tweets directing them
to the petition. This design allows us to explore network effects while avoiding
homophily concerns (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001).
We find that private directmessages on Twitter are highly effective tools for gen-
erating online petition signatures, a common advocacy goal. In addition, we find
no evidence that the type of identity primed affects the likelihood of signing an on-
line petition. However, those assigned to the “follower” condition are more likely
in both experiments to tweet a link to the petition to their own followers. Results
from our secondary manipulation are mixed: In our second experiment but not
the first, we find evidence of network effects among followers of the organization’s
own followers. Finally and most surprisingly, no one who was exposed to only the
public tweet either signed the petition or tweeted the link to their own followers.
In addition to providing practical guidance for organizations with dedicated
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follower networks, these results suggest that the advantages of personal appeals
identified in face-to-face campaigns can carry over into the virtual world (Rosen-
stone and Hansen 1993; Gerber and Green 2000). They also show that invoking
identities associated with different levels of commitment to a cause can affect one’s
propensity to comply with a simple request. This evidence has potential impli-
cations for the continuing debate on whether online campaigns of the type stud-
ied here merely promote “slacktivism”—token, low-cost emblems of support inca-
pable of sustaining meaningful collective action (Morozov 2009; Gladwell 2010).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we review recent the-
oretical arguments on whether social media can facilitate or hinder collective ac-
tion. We then outline the potential pitfalls of analyzing experimental manipula-
tions over social networks like Twitter. In the next section, we provide an overview
of the universe of subjects—the follower network of a large nonprofit advocacy
organization—and place it in context. Then, we describe the research design and
analytic strategy of the two experiments. The three subsequent sections report the
results of both experiments in addition to the heterogeneous effects of treatment
by account type. The final section concludes with a discussion.
Participation, Collective Action, and Social Media
Scholars have sought to understand how lowered communication costs and the
proliferation of online social networks have altered the traditional logic of collective
action (Olson 1965). One set of responses focuses on the scope of action: The rela-
tively low-effort individual contributions involved in online campaigns necessarily
limit the value of resulting public goods (Gladwell 2010; Shulman 2009). In con-
trast to this pessimistic assessment, some communication scholars—basing their
insights on grassroots anti-globalization campaigns or, more recently, events lead-
ing up to the Arab Spring—delineate how new communication technologies can
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foster real-world spontaneous collective action in the absence of formal organiza-
tion or leadership (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). These theories extend Olson’s
classic work to networked, often digitally mediated contexts.
Little theoreticalwork thus far explicitly invokes Twitter (seeMarwick and boyd
2011 for an exception), but many of the ideas carry over from discussions of viral
email campaigns. For example, Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl (2005) associate the act
of contributing to a collective good with a transition across the boundary from pri-
vate to public. However, because the new technologies often blur the line between
public and private, they find that “boundary crossing in connection with public
goods takes on forms not so readily recognizable in the theoretical terms of free
riding, selective incentives, and organization” (p. 378). In this alternative frame-
work, forwarding a petition (or, perhaps, retweeting amessage) is a “nearly costless
request” tomake private or semiprivate information—that is, the fact that someone
supports a campaign—public.1
Another perspective, championed by Benkler (2006) and Bennett and Segerberg
(2012), emphasizes hownetworks enable the co-production of collective goods, fos-
tered via individual self-expression. Prototypical examples in this tradition include
the open-source software movement and Wikipedia, relatively decentralized net-
works of contributors who help to create and maintain free public resources. In
the political realm, the movement against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) or for
net neutrality might fall in this category of “connective action,” although the type
of mobilization studied here falls more clearly under the traditional umbrella of
“organizationally brokered networks” (Bennett and Segerberg 2012, p. 756). As we
demonstrate in these experiments, networked participation can arise from centrally
organized campaigns as well.
1Sharing private information with third parties is now an ingrained part of online behavior,
with potential benefits for both traditional advocacy groups and networked movements.
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Classic treatments of participation in politics understandably focus on factors
affecting the likelihood that different types of citizens will vote, volunteer for a can-
didate, or contribute in some other way on behalf of a political cause. This study
necessarily approaches the topic differently, focusing on people who have already
self-selected as followers of a prominent environmental advocacy organization. In
effect, we condition on the usual determinants of participation as presented in the
Civic Voluntarism Model (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995): resources, motiva-
tion, and intensive engagementwith a political issue. Accordingly, our experiments
focus on the model’s remaining ingredient, “networks of recruitment” (p. 3).2 Al-
though Verba, Schlozman and Brady assumed that such networks would consist
of commonly studied social ties such as friends, family, and co-workers, we extend
this notion to include connections based on affinity.
Recruitment networks are a useful concept for studying mobilization in an on-
line context. Aside from capturing the possibility of “viral” or network patterns in
campaign activity, they allow us to compare the effectiveness of appeals that orig-
inate from the organization itself with those from non-affiliated but like-minded
supporters of its environmental mission. This distinction between direct appeals
and peer effects is important for at least two reasons. The first relates to Olson’s
original observation about the “noticeability” of individual contributions, which
implies that as organizations become large, shirking becomes unobservable to other
members and free-riding inevitable (barring selective incentives, coercion, or other
inducements to cooperate). Peer effects facilitated via transparent social networks,
by contrast, are one possible way in which online organizing could overcome the
problem of “noticeability” and mitigate the incentives to free-ride in large groups
(Lupia and Sin 2003).
2The organization-centered design also addresses any concern about our lack of covariates for
these traditional predictors of participation, although we analyze differential effects by factors that
we were able to capture, gender and organizational status.
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Second, the distinction matters because social ties may reflect group member-
ship. This insight arises from the Elaborated Social Identity Model, which was
constructed to explain how groupmembership can induce collective action (Drury
et al. 2005). The theory presupposes the existence of a grassroots in-group and a
powerful out-group; any action taken by the in-group against the out-group that
appears to succeed is “experienced as joyful and exhilarating” (Barr and Drury
2009, p. 245). This model has been applied to induce voter mobilization by la-
beling targets as “voters” rather than simply people who vote (Bryan et al. 2011).
“Donor” and “activist” identities have also been associated with increased char-
itable donations and activism, respectively (Aaker and Akutsu 2009), though no
published large-scale field experiments have evaluated the impact of the “donor,”
“organizer,” or “activist” identity labels on those outcomes.
With our design, elaborated below, we simultaneously address several of the
theoretical debates raised in the literature. First, we measure the effects of our
manipulations on two primary outcomes: filling out (or “signing”) an online pe-
tition, and tweeting (or retweeting) a link to the petition to one’s own followers.
The former is recognizable as a contribution to a public good, one traditionally val-
ued as part of the political organizer’s toolbox (Karpf 2010). The latter is a some-
what more ambiguous—but arguably less costly—action that, if repeated by many
other members, could lead to increased public awareness of the campaign (and its
magnitude of support). An important difference between the two outcomes is that
tweeting more directly captures whether the “noticeability” of the behavior leads
to enhanced effectiveness, allowing for a test of how Olson’s logic may operate dif-
ferently when mediated via online communication networks. Second, we examine
the effects of three types of appeals: Generic appeals via the organization’s pub-
lic Twitter account, specific appeals via private direct messages, and tweets from
followers of the organization to their own followers. These differ in the extent to
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which they depend on social ties, direct contact, and the authority of a trusted orga-
nization. Finally, we vary the identity labels used to address our subjects, enabling
us to examine whether the salience of specific social identities is associated with
the likelihood of contributing to the organization’s goals.
To briefly summarize the expectations of the participation and online collective
action literature to date, we believe that the work of Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl
(2005) would lead to a prediction of larger treatment effects for the (re)tweeting
outcome, which involves the relatively low-cost act of making one’s support for a
cause (more) public. The “slacktivism” hypothesis, by contrast, straightforwardly
predicts strong treatment effects for the lowest-cost actions regardless of whether
they make information public. This leads to the expectation that subjects across
all conditions will retweet LCV’s public tweet but that fewer will take the time
to sign the petition (and subsequently tweet out the link to it). Finally, the Civic
VoluntarismModel (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) predicts that “networks of
recruitment” will be most effective at mobilizing followers: The largest treatment
effects will be observed when subjects are exposed to tweets from peers.
The Challenges of Experiments on Twitter
In the terminology of network analysis, the socialmicroblogging service Twitter is a
directed graph. Users post short, public updates and curate their own networks by
“following” others—friends and strangers alike—whomay or may not reciprocate.
A particular user’s Twitter messages, or “tweets,” can be read by anyone who visits
his or her public feed (also known as a timeline). Sincemanually reading individual
feeds can be cumbersome, users typically take advantage of the Twitter “stream,” a
real-time aggregation of tweets from users they follow. The result is a never-ending
rush of text and photo updates from sources of a user’s choosing.
There are several specificways of communicating on Twitter. Most fundamental
45
is the tweet, usually restricted to 140 characters (with exceptions for web addresses
of reasonable length). “Retweets” (RTs) allow users to quickly resend a tweet from
their stream to those of their own followers. (In other words, a retweet copies a
tweet from a user’s incoming stream to his or her own feed, with attribution.) In
extreme cases, this capability can lead to cascades of retweets of particularly com-
pelling content. Other tweets, while not necessarily retweets, can “mention” an-
other user. This option can lead to extended public conversations, all potentially
referring back to an initial Twitter posting. Finally, while Twitter is best known for
its public functionality, it also allows users to send private “direct messages” (DMs)
to any of their followers. By default, Twitter sends users an email notification when
they receive a DM.
Public tweets comprise the bulk of a typical Twitter account’s activity, yet they
present challenges for the design and analysis of experiments. Since public tweets
and retweets are visible to followers of the sender, a simple experimental design
in which some followers are randomized to be shown a public tweet and others
in a control group are not is effectively impossible. An alternative design would
randomly time a series of public tweets with different messages, but any causal
inferences would require strong modeling assumptions concerning the over-time
persistence of treatment effects (for example, if the same message is tweeted every
other day, followers may become irritated and respond differently from how they
otherwise would).
Instead, we take advantage of Twitter’s direct message capability, which allows
us to present different messages to different users. Estimation of the relative effec-
tiveness of the messages can proceed in the normal fashion, under an assumption
of non-interference between units. The non-interference assumption (sometimes
referred to as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, or SUTVA) requires
that subjects’ outcomes not be influenced by the treatment assignments of other
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subjects. The interference concern is not trivial: Unmodeled spillovers can lead
to biased estimates of treatment effects (Gerber and Green 2012, Chapter 8). For
example, if direct messages were highly effective at motivating petition signatures
and subsequent tweets, but those tweets exposed subjects in the control group to
the same message, a naive difference-in-means estimate would be biased.
A schematic version of an analytic approach to dealing with spillovers of this
kind is as follows: First, redefine treatment categories to include “spillover condi-
tions” such as being in the condition of following one subject who received a direct
message. Second, calculate the probability that each unit is in each redefined treat-
ment condition. Because Twitter users follow vastly different numbers of other
users, these probabilities will vary quite a bit from unit to unit. Third, weight each
unit’s outcome by the inverse of the probability of being in its observed condition.
Average differences across these redefined treatment categories will reflect unbi-
ased treatment effect estimates.
The trouble with this approach is the prohibitively large number of potential
treatment categories: anywhere from following zero treated units to following 601
(the largest out-degree observed in our network). One could instead parameterize
the “dosage” of spillovers and estimate a response curve for each extra treated unit
(see Bowers, Fredrickson and Panagopoulos 2013 for themethod, Coppock 2014 for
an application). Such a method, however, requires the researcher to make strong
functional form assumptions concerning exposure.
Our solution is to vastly reduce the number of potential spillover conditions
by design. As discussed below, we randomly induce a relatively small subset of
the network to retweet to their followers, which in turn randomly exposes some
users but not others to the petition link.3 Most users only follow one user in this
3Contrast this with the case in which the organization is sending the public tweets—all of their
followers are potentially exposed. When a random subset of users tweet the link, however, only
a portion of the organization’s followers are exposed, allowing for experimental differences to be
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subset, so the number of spillover conditions is quitemanageable. Additionally, the
variability of exposure probabilities is kept in check. In effect, this approach allows
us to randomize “natural” Twitter behavior and directly estimate its consequences.
Because of the difficulties outlined here, it is not surprising that randomized
experiments on Twitter have been rare. One study randomly encouraged subjects
to follow a Japanese politician on Twitter to test effects on trait evaluations, knowl-
edge, and other post-treatment outcomes (Kobayashi and Ichifuji 2014). A market-
ing study tested the effectiveness of tweets and retweets on television ratings by
collaborating with a media company, as well as “influential” tweeters, to promote
a random subset of its TV shows on the Chinese social network Sina Weibo (Gong
et al. 2014). The unit of analysis in this design was the shows themselves. Finally,
there is ongoing research on the relationship between identity and behavior on so-
cial media. A randomized experiment on a web-based social sharing site (but not
Twitter) found that cues indicating an account’s identity matter in terms of how
users share content associated with that account (Taylor, Muchnik and Aral 2014).
Overview of Network
The League of ConservationVoters is an environmental advocacy organization that
“works to turn environmental values into national, state and local priorities,” ac-
cording to its official website. Its activities include public awareness campaigns,
lobbying efforts, and independent expenditures (via political action committees)
geared toward electing candidates who support its agenda.
The two field experiments analyzed herewere deployed over the network of fol-
lowers of LCV’s official Twitter account, @LCVoters. The members of this network
comprise an “issue public” in the literal sense (Converse 1964; Verba, Schlozman
and Brady 1995): highly dedicated to promoting the environment and publicly vis-
observed.
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ible in their activism. Studying the impact of mobilization tactics on such a net-
work speaks to the effectiveness of promoting activism among politically engaged
individuals, although any generalizations to other populations would have to be
qualified.
While the network is highly engaged, it is not a close-knit community. Rather,
it is mainly a network of strangers. Members all share a common interest in the
environment, but there are relatively few interconnections between them: Out of
a possible 44,709,282 connections between nodes, there were 131,474 such edges
when the network was scraped before Study 1, yielding a graph density of 0.0029.
Put more simply, followers of the organization follow a median of only six users in
the organization’s network. This structure correspondsmost closely to a “Broadcast
Network,” as described by the Pew Research Center’s typology of conversational
archetypes on Twitter.4 Such “hub and spoke” networks consist of an audience of
followers who typically rebroadcast (i.e., retweet) the output of a single source, in
this case LCV.
An additional feature of the network, as Figure 2.1 illustrates, is its relatively dif-
fuse nature. Unlike a highly modular social network with various distinct group-
ings, this one has numerous and overlapping communities that are difficult to dis-
tinguish from each other. Network statistics confirm this impression: TheWalktrap
algorithm (with standard defaults) finds 22 communities in the network, for amod-
ularity of 0.3.
Describing a network with statistics such as the graph density and the modu-
larity is usually insufficient for conveying its structure. Modularity, for example,
depends on the number of communities detected; different algorithms come to dif-




Figure 2.1: An illustration of the network of 6,687 followers of the advocacy or-
ganization’s Twitter account scraped before Study 1. Lines illustrate connections
between users and are shaded by membership in one of 22 communities as deter-
mined by the Walktrap community detection algorithm.
view, the principal utility of these statistics is to provide partial justification for our
description of the subject pool as a being a social community only in the loosest
sense.
For Study 1, we constructed our universe of subjects by scraping the Twitter ID
numbers of LCV’s followers, excluding those who hadmore than 5,000 followers of
their own. The reasoning behind this decision was that users with especially large
numbers of followers were more likely to be prominent individuals or organiza-
tions whose online behavior would not be comparable with the rest of the subject
pool. The resulting network contained 6,687 members. For Study 2, conducted
five months later, we repeated this procedure and obtained a network with 8,507
members.
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Figure 2.2: The number of tweets and retweets sent by LCV per day, from February
2013 to February 2015.
LCV’s Twitter account is fairly active, sending out an average of 6.07 tweets and
retweets perweekday from February 2013 to February 2015. However, as Figure 2.2
shows, day-to-day variation in the number of tweets posted is high (s.d. = 10.05).
This activity has not stopped the network from continuing to grow, suggesting that
its followers, in addition to being dedicated to the cause, are accustomed to frequent
Twitter updates from the organization.
This is likely also the case for comparable organizations. Table 2.1 lists the num-
ber of followers and average number of tweets per weekday for the top 10 most in-
fluential environmental organizations (by 2014 lobbying expenditures as collected
by OpenSecrets.org). The mean number of followers among this group, 118,988, is
an order of magnitude higher than LCV’s number of followers, and average tweet
frequency—about 13 per weekday—is slightlymore than twice as high. Finally, the
median creation date for these organizations’ Twitter accounts wasmid-2008, fairly
early in Twitter’s history.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics (circa February 2015) of Twitter accounts of the top
10 environmental organizations by 2014 lobbying expenditures, plus LCV. “T/W”
= the number of tweets per weekday and counts retweets.
Organization Account Followers T/W Created
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund @Earthjustice 67,004 8.60 2008
Environmental Defense Fund @EnvDefenseFund 93,619 6.87 2009
Environmental Working Group @ewg 35,279 7.65 2008
Intl Assn of Fish & Wildlife Agencies @fishwildlife 1,229 1.30 2010
League of Conservation Voters @LCVoters 10,880 6.07 2009
Nature Conservancy @nature_org 387,973 9.60 2008
National Parks Conservation Assn @NPCA 108,164 11.47 2009
Natural Resources Defense Council @NRDCFedGov 681 2.10 2012
National Wildlife Federation @NWF 296,513 14.60 2007
Sierra Club @sierraclub 143,448 42.67 2009
Wilderness Society @Wilderness 55,971 28.07 2007
Research Design
We conducted two field experiments with nearly identical designs; lessons learned
from the first experiment improved the design of the second. In both studies, LCV
first posted a public tweet urging supporters to sign an online petition and retweet
the link to their own followers. In a first-stage experiment, subjects were randomly
assigned to one of three groups: (1) the baseline or control group, which was ex-
posed to the public tweet only; (2) a condition in which subjects also received a DM
with a similar request, referring to them as “followers”; (3) a condition in which
subjects also received a DM referring to them as “organizers.” In a second-stage
experiment, those who completed the petition were randomly shown a link with
an encouragement to tweet the petition to their own followers. We will refer to this
treatment as the “tweet encouragement” or the “tweet link.”
Study 1
In Study 1, LCV’s tweet and petition were related to an ongoing campaign to end
tax breaks to “Big Oil.” The public tweet, posted on February 5, 2014, was followed
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by theDMs,5 which had to be sent in 12 daily batches.6 (SeeAppendix B4 for the full
text of all messages.) In this version of the design, subjects who completed the pe-
tition were required to enter their Twitter usernames in order to connect responses
back to treatment assignment.
The initial randomization procedure assigned one-third of the subjects in each
of the DM conditions to be shown a tweet encouragement after submitting the pe-
tition signature, using complete random assignment.7 In total, subjects could be
assigned to one of five treatment conditions. We collected outcome data in two
concurrent ways: Online petition signatures were collected by survey software,
while tweet and retweet behavior was captured by scraping programs that we ran
continually for the duration of the experiment. We ranmultiple scrapers in parallel
to guard against accidental data loss.8
Table 2.2 shows the number of subjects within each condition and the propor-
tions signing the petition and tweeting the petition link to their followers. Ta-
ble 2.2 also reveals an anomalous finding that suggests a potential issue with the
randomization: Assignment to be shown the tweet encouragement predicted peti-
tion signatures (p < .01). Since the encouragement was only displayed to subjects
after signing the petition, it is possible that randomization failed to eliminate un-
observed differences between subjects assigned and not assigned to the tweet en-
couragement condition. We exhaustively investigated the possible sources of this
5“Follower” condition: “You’re one of our most valuable followers! Please RT this petition to
your friends to stop tax breaks to Big Oil. [URL to petition]”; “organizer” petition: “You’re one of
our most valuable organizers! Please RT this petition to your friends to stop tax breaks to Big Oil.
[URL to petition]”
6Twitter’s API limits the number of DMs that an application can send to 250 per day. Subjects
were randomly selected into batches.
7This was done by using two different versions of the petition. See Figure B1 in Appendix B4
for a screen shot of the encouragement, and Figure A2 for the tweet window that popped up if a
user clicked on the tweet encouragement.
8By “scraping” we mean continually querying the Twitter API in order to capture tweets con-
taining the URLs to either version of the petition. We used this approach because Twitter data is
much easier to collect in real time than after the fact.
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Table 2.2: Study 1: Design and Outcomes
Treatment Group N Signed Tweeted
Public Tweet 3687 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Organizer DM
Tweet encouragement 500 22 (4.4%) 12 (2.4%)
No encouragement 1000 28 (2.8%) 12 (1.2%)
Follower DM
Tweet encouragement 500 28 (5.6%) 25 (5.0%)
No encouragement 1000 31 (3.1%) 16 (1.6%)
Total 6687 109 (1.6%) 65 (1.0%)
imbalance, such as day-of-week effects, faulty randomization procedure, and data
problems, but we were unable to conclusively pinpoint the cause. The most plau-
sible explanation is that an imbalance occurred simply by chance. In Study 2, we
addressed this problem by waiting until subjects clicked through to the online pe-
tition to conduct the second-stage random assignment.
In our analysis of the first-stage experiment (the direct message treatments),
we will first examine average differences across treatment assignments, with and
without covariate adjustment. Using information from users’ public Twitter pro-
files, we were able to gather the following covariates: account type (male, female,
organization, or unknown), number of followers, and the number of days the ac-
count was open.9 We also calculated each subject’s eigenvector centrality, a mea-
sure of howwell-connected the user is within the LCV network. For our analysis of
the first-stage experiment, we will rely on a strict assumption of non-interference
among units. Table 2.2 contains some indication that this assumption is not wholly
unwarranted: Despite 65 tweets of the link throughout the network, a grand total
of zero subjects in the public tweet condition signed the petition. At least among
this subset, we can be sure of the non-interference assumption. (See also Sinclair,
McConnell and Green 2012 for evidence that the non-interference assumption is
9See below for the details of this procedure.
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well-justified in get-out-the-vote mail experiments.)
The subjects in the second-stage experiment (the encouragement to retweet)
were those whomet the following criteria: They followed both LCV and users who
signed the petition. The petition received 109 signatures; these 109 users were fol-
lowed by a total of 1,176 other LCV followers. The 1,176 were the pool of subjects
randomly assigned to the condition of following someone exposed to the tweet en-
couragement. Similar to the procedure described earlier, wewill weight each obser-
vation by the probability of exposure, as thosewho followmore of the 109 aremore
likely to be exposed. We will estimate both the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect using or-
dinary least squares (OLS) and the complier average causal effect (CACE) using
instrumental variables (IV). The definition of a complier in the second-stage exper-
iment is a mouthful: a complier is a user who follows one or more petition signers
who tweeted the link if and only if shown the tweet encouragement. Though it may
seem counterintuitive, the analysis of the second-stage experiment also assumes
non-interference—we assume that a unit’s outcomes do not depend on whether or
not some other unit follows a petition signer assigned to the tweet encouragement.
One may wonder about users who do not follow LCV but may still have been
exposed to tweets by virtue of following a petition signer. As it happens, exactly
zero petition signatures and subsequent tweets were recorded for non-followers of
LCV, providing evidence that among that subsample, our manipulation had no ef-
fect on these outcomes. There is one significant exception to this finding, however:
In Study 1, 5 users not in the LCV’s network retweeted either the public tweet or a
tweet from one of the followers. In Study 2 this number was 7. With over 7 million
total followers of the LCV’s followers, these magnitudes are minuscule, but they
are greater than zero.
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Study 2
We implemented a nearly identical research design in Study 2, with someminor im-
provements to simplify analysis and address the randomization concern described
above. To ensure successful randomization in the second stage of the design in
Study 2, we used simple random assignment of the tweet encouragement within
the survey software (Qualtrics) itself. The three main treatment conditions re-
mained unchanged from Study 1. For those treatments, we used block random
assignment by day and number of followers.
We further made two changes to the way the web links (URLs) to the petition
worked. First, we were able to incorporate the abbreviated version of the organi-
zation’s name (LCV) into the URLs themselves in order to boost realism. Second,
we passed on the anonymized Twitter IDs of each subject as a query to each URL
sent in the DMs so that we couldmore easilymerge individual-level outcomeswith
treatment assignment.
In Study 2, the subject of the Twitter campaign was more timely: the Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s plan to issue regulations mandating reduced carbon
emissions from power plants. The public tweet was posted on July 2, 2014, and
DMs were sent in 20 batches beginning that day.10 Between them, the 221 peti-
tion signers were followed by 1,990 other users, who constitute the subjects of the
second-stage experiment in Study 2. Table 2.3 summarizes the design and basic
outcomes of Study 2.
10“Follower” condition: “You’re one of our most valuable followers! Help fight climate change
by signing the petition & tweet to your friends! [URL]”; “organizer” condition: “You’re one of our
most valuable organizers! Help fight climate change by signing the petition & tweet to your friends!
[URL]”
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Table 2.3: Study 2: Design and Outcomes
Treatment Group N Signed Tweeted
Public Tweet 3495 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Organizer DM 2514 107 (4.3%) 28 (1.1%)
Follower DM 2498 114 (4.6%) 36 (1.4%)
Total 8507 221 (2.6%) 64 (0.8%)
Among Subjects Who Signed Petition
Tweet encouragement 111 111 (100.0%) 50 (45%)
No encouragement 110 110 (100.0%) 11 (10%)
Total 221 221 (100.0%) 61 (27.6%)
Results: Study 1
Study 1’s results challenge the conventional wisdom about Twitter’s mobilization
capabilities on at least two fronts. Perhaps most surprisingly, not a single subject in
the public tweet condition either signed the petition or retweeted the petition link.
It is important to reiterate that subjects were exposed to a single public tweet, so
this result does not rule out the possibility that a more concerted campaign with
multiple tweets might have worked.11 Further, it is possible that infrequent Twitter
users never saw the tweet at all. The ineffectiveness of the public tweet stands in
contrast to the strong showing of the direct messages. Without prior research to
guide our expectations, wewould not have been surprised at either a null finding or
a negative “backlash” effect.12 One alternative interpretation of these results is that
DMs are more effective due to repeat exposure: Subjects may have responded to
the DMs because they had already seen a public tweet featuring the samemessage,
but a tweet alone is not enough to drive outcomes.
11Suppose that the true treatment effect is that a public tweet generates a single click per 10,000
followers exposed. With a sample size of 6,687, we would expect to observe zero clicks about 51%
of the time.
12These also seemed like plausible results ex ante; during a pilot study in which I sent automated
direct messages to a subset of my followers, several recipients warned about “spam” or a possible
virus.
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Afinal finding, but onewe interpret with caution given the potential imbalance,
is that the “organizer” condition caused subjects to send significantly fewer tweets
using the randomly assigned tweet encouragement. We detail these findings and
discuss the absence of network effects below.
Main Effects
First, we look at petition signatures as the outcome of interest. As the first two
columns of Table 2.4 show, the “follower” and “organizer” treatments both had
positive and significant effects at the p < .01 level. The follower DM caused an
estimated 3.9-percentage-point increase in the proportion of subjects who signed
the petition. The organizer DM caused a 3.3-percentage-point increase in partici-
pation; these effects are not significantly different from each other (p = 0.38). Thus,
the best interpretation of the evidence fromStudy 1 is that receiving any directmes-
sage (after potentially seeing a similar public tweet) caused a 3.6-percentage-point

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Next, we turn to the tweet outcome. The last three columns of Table 2.4 show
that both DM conditions produced a positive causal effect on tweet activity. The
“organizer” message caused fewer tweets than the “follower” message: 1.1 per-
centage points fewer than the 2.7-percentage-point boost generated by the follower
message among subjects assigned to the DM conditions (p = 0.03). This evidence
is suggestive of a priming effect in which the “organizer” identity reduces the fu-
ture likelihood of tweeting but not the more immediate task of signing an online
petition. We return to this apparent finding below.
The second stage of the experiment was designed to identify the causal effect of
the tweet button on subsequent tweet activity by the subject’s own followers. Ta-
ble 2.5 shows that the among those who completed the petition, the effect of being
shown a tweet button was large: The treatment caused nearly half of exposed sub-
jects to click and tweet amessage about the petition to their followers. (The positive
constant may seem counterintuitive, but upon investigation we discovered that it
reflects users who independently tweeted a link to the petition without using the
supplied functionality—either manually or, for example, using a built-in Twitter
app in their web browsers. This also illustrates the advantage of an experimental
design, which can distinguish between this baseline activity and tweets caused by
the manipulation.)
The interaction in Model 2 reiterates the previous finding that the organizer
message appeared to depress tweet activity. Under an additional assumption13 that
all subjects who signed the petition in oneDM conditionwould have signed the pe-
tition in the other DMcondition, we can interpret the heterogeneous effect in causal
terms: Being primed as an “organizer” caused the encouragement to be less effec-
tive to the tune of more than 38 percentage points. In other words, the “follower”
prime was more than twice as effective at encouraging future tweets as the “or-
13See Appendix B1 for a full discussion of this assumption and its plausibility in this application.
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ganizer” prime. This is a substantial difference although, again, its interpretation
rests crucially on the assumption referenced above.
Table 2.5: Study 1: Effects of Tweet Encouragement
Tweeted
(1) (2)




Encouragement X Organizer −0.384∗∗
(0.170)




∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Network Effects
Recall that the subjects of the second-stage experiment were followers of petition
signers. In effect, randomly treating some petition signers with the treat encour-
agement randomly exposed their followers to additional tweets. Column 1 of Table
2.6 shows that this manipulation was quite effective—those who followed exposed
subjects were 63 percentage points more likely to have seen a retweeted message.
However, despite being potentially exposed to retweets, columns two through five
show that treated subjects were not significantly more likely to sign or tweet the
message themselves. This finding parallels the ineffectiveness of public tweet sent
by our partner organization. At least in this experiment, only direct messages had



























































































































































































































































































The results from Study 2 are broadly in line with those of Study 1.14 In particular,
we replicated the finding that the “organizer” DM condition caused fewer subse-
quent tweets. The public tweet did not have a significant effect on petition signa-
tures; in this study as well, not a single subject assigned to the public condition
completed the petition. As before, additional exposure to direct messages caused
a significant number of petition signatures and tweets.
Main Effects
The effect sizeswe estimate fromStudy 2 are somewhat larger than those in Study 1,
but they remain substantively comparable.15 The “follower” and “organizer” mes-
sages boosted petition signatures by 4.6 and 4.3 percentage points, respectively (see
Table 2.7). The effects of the direct messages on signing were not significantly dif-
ferent from each other (p = 0.60). The direct messages also significantly increased
tweet behavior. As in Study 1, priming the “follower” identity was more effective
than the “organizer” identity, though the difference is no longer statistically signif-
icant.
14We did not find any evidence of balance problems as in Study 1.
15This could reflect the fact that the campaign was more timely and related to a current political



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The tweet link caused a 35.0-percentage-point increase in tweeting behavior
in the restricted model shown in Table 2.8, but, as in Study 1, there were differ-
ential effects by DM condition: The button increased tweets by 47.2 percentage
points among subjects sent the “follower” message and by 23.1 percentage points
among subjects sent the “organizer” message. Again, we can interpret this differ-
ence causally under the assumption that all petition signers in one DM condition
would have signed in the other condition.
Table 2.8: Study 2: Effects of Tweet Button on Subsequent Tweets
Tweeted
(1) (2)




Encouragement X Organizer −0.241∗∗
(0.110)




∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Network Effects
In contrast to the null network findings in Study 1, Table 2.9 presents evidence that
signing the petition was strongly influenced by others’ tweets. Column 1 shows
that the manipulation was effective. Column 2 shows an ITT effect of the tweet en-
couragement of 2.0 percentage points. Column 3 shows the estimated effect among
compliers: Subjects who followed others who tweet if and only if they are shown
the tweet encouragement were 5.6 percentage points more likely to sign the peti-
tion. Considering the relatively low rates of participation generally, these effects
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are substantively large. Columns 4 and 5 repeat the analyses for the “tweeted” de-
pendent variable: We observe no significant differences by exposure condition at
the p < 0.05 level. Still, the fact that network effects on petition signatures are larger
in magnitude than the main effect of direct contact from LCV itself is broadly con-
sistent with the notion that “networks of recruitment” are important for promoting




























































































































































































































































































Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Account Type
Theories of how online mobilization activities affect political behavior are focused
on the individual citizen: Appeals from peers or groups via social networks may
induce citizens to make contributions to public goods. The treatments deployed
in our two experiments were developed with individual Twitter users in mind;
however, the direct messages were sent to the accounts of organizations as well.
All else being equal, we would expect individual users to be more likely to both
sign the petition and retweet the petition link.
Twitter does not provide account-type information, so we hand-coded the pro-
files of all experimental subjects. We coded each account as female, male, an or-
ganization, or unknown. We relied on users’ profile pictures and descriptions to
determine account type. Organizations were easy to identify: They typically use
language such as “We are a non-profit dedicated to. . . ” in their description fields.
Determining gender could be difficult when the profile pictures were not clearly
male or female. When possible, we used cues in the description field such as “Ac-
tivist, educator, and father of two. . . .” When we could not determine gender or
organizational status, we coded a profile as being of unknown type. Two of the au-
thors carried out the coding; on a sample of 200 profiles, our inter-coder reliability
was extremely high (Cohen’s κ = 0.90).
Figure 2.3 presents the results of our heterogeneous effects analyses. The con-
ditional average treatment effects (CATEs) and 95% confidence intervals are shown
for all four account types, broken out by dependent variable and study. In Study 1,
we observe some treatment effect heterogeneity on the “signed” dependent vari-
able: Treatment effects are much smaller for organizations compared to individu-
als. We observe no such heterogeneity for the “tweeted” dependent variable. The
second row presents the estimates for Study 2. We see nearly the identical pattern:
On the “signed” dependent variable, organizations have much smaller treatment
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Figure 2.3: Entries are conditional differences-in-means with 95% confidence inter-
vals. In Study 1, the sample was 38.4% male, 30.4% female, 24.4% organizations,
and 6.8% unknown; in Study 2, the sample was 39.3% male, 32.9% female, 22.1%
organizations, and 5.7% unknown.
effects than individuals, but this difference is not apparent for the “tweeted” de-
pendent variable. Interestingly, there is no consistent pattern for the relative size of
treatment effects among men and women; the treatments appear to work equally
well for both, regardless of dependent variable.
We present these estimates in a regression format in Appendix B3, along with
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heterogeneous effects analyses by subjects’ number of followers, number of days
their Twitter account was active, and eigenvector centrality.16 These analyses do
not uncover a systematic pattern of treatment effect heterogeneity, though it does
appear that treatment effects are marginally smaller for more central users. We
interpret this finding cautiously, since organizational accounts tend to have higher
centrality scores.
Discussion
This study identifies several robust findings about the effectiveness of different
types of mobilization appeals on Twitter. First, direct messages are far superior to
public tweets in generating supportive behavior in the form of online petition sig-
natures, tweets, or even retweets. In both of our experiments, not a single subject
assigned to be exposed only to the public tweet signed or retweeted the petition.
We find that DMs produce approximately a 4-percentage-point increase in clicks.
If an organization were to send out 250 direct messages (the maximum) per day for
30 days, they could expect to collect 250 · 30 · 0.04 = 300 signatures over the course
of a month. While this is a modest number, it should be weighed alongside the cost
per DM, which is effectively zero.
Our results speak to the literature on social media and collective action. We
find some support for the “reconceptualized” collective action theory of Bimber,
Flanagin and Stohl (2005) when comparing the magnitudes of our effects. DMs of
both types cause an increase in petition signatures greater than the effect on overall
tweets to the petition link. However, compared to the effect of randomly assigning
subjects who had already completed the petition to see the tweet button (35 to 45
percentage points), we see that the act of sending out a public tweet is arguably
much easier to induce than a petition requiring some time or effort to complete.
16Appendix B2 presents randomization checks using these covariates.
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While this is also consistent with some notions of “slacktivism,” we find that over-
all hypothesis difficult to square with the null effect of the public tweet on retweets
in both studies. Overall, the results seem most consistent with the traditional per-
spective elaborated in the Civic Voluntarism Model, in which network effects are
most effective.
Designing experiments on a social network like Twitter is difficult for a num-
ber of reasons. Most apparent is the fact that public tweets are potentially visible
to anyone, which makes identifying their effects impossible without imposing ad-
ditional assumptions about over-time persistence and anticipation. Another issue
inherent to Twitter is a lack of individual-level exposure measures: Even if there
existed a reliable indicator for whether a tweet was potentially visible to a given
user (perhaps because a mobile or desktop app was active at the time), it would
still greatly overstate whether it was actually seen and retained. This means that
practically speaking, the only available estimand will be intent-to-treat (ITT).
One exception is cases in which the treatment is an encouragement to tweet and
compliance can easily be measured. Our second-stage experiments, in which sub-
jects were followers of the tweeters, have precisely this design. Its advantage is in
distinguishing between the effects of homophily—similar users may already fol-
low each other, be interested in similar issues, and retweet each other’s updates—
from the effects of contagion (McPherson, Smith-Lovin andCook 2001; Fowler et al.
2011). In Study 2 but not Study 1, we find that inducing tweet behavior within
the network causes a significant and substantively large number of additional pe-
tition signatures. This is a potentially important finding for organizations seeking
to launch “viral” campaigns: public tweets may bemore effective when sent by fol-
lowers of an organization than by the organization itself. Alternatively, users may
require repeated exposure to public tweets in order for them to be effective. How-
ever, since this finding did not replicate across both studies, it should be interpreted
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with caution.
Regardless, messages to followers are effective when they take the form of pri-
vate DMs. While this may seem counterintuitive given Twitter’s public network
structure, one possible explanation is that individualized contact gives these mes-
sages the same essential properties as email (most users in fact receive an email
notification when sent a DM). Email can be ineffective for certain purposes, such
as mobilizing voter turnout (Nickerson 2007). But if a message is perceived as so-
licited contact from a trusted source, we hypothesize that it can be effective. This is
consistent with existing research on emailed recruitment messages for web-based
surveys, which emphasizes the torrent of unsolicited email and spam that users
face daily. As one study points out (Porter andWhitcomb 2003), despite the relative
ease with which spammers can mimic other senders, “it is still difficult to change
the credibility of the message itself” (p. 587). In this case, the credibility lies in the
fact that the recipient has already chosen to follow updates from the originator of
the message (albeit over another medium).
Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that these effects depend onmulti-
ple exposures to the samemessage (via an initial public tweet and subsequent DM).
Future designs might vary exposure to public tweets over time in order to better
address this question. It is also possible that public tweets work differently than
posts on other social networks, such as Facebook. While we cannot test this possi-
bility here, it seems plausible that the sheer number of tweets posted in real time
diminish the effectiveness of any single post, while Facebook’s algorithms keep the
amount of social content to a manageable level, thus boosting the impact of any in-
dividual item. Experimental research has found strong effects of get-out-the-vote
posts on Facebook, for example (Teresi and Michelson 2014).
Our final result is the differential effect of the “follower” and “organizer” iden-
tity primes. Existing research in social psychology has established that priming in-
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dividual traits can have subsequent, unconscious effects on behavior. This can also
extend to the ways in which people perceive themselves: When priming specific
values (e.g., caring about the environment), subjectswill tend to adjust their choices
and behavior accordingly—but only if those values are central to their self-concept
(Verplanken and Holland 2002). The implications for this study are straightfor-
ward. If members of an engaged network of environmental activists view them-
selves as organizers, priming this identity could bring forward other relevant con-
siderations, such as the commitment it entails.
The differential effects of the “organizer” versus “follower” messages on the
probability of tweeting may shed light on two theoretical questions. The first is,
How does the authenticity of a message change its effectiveness? Twitter users
may find the “organizer” label disingenuous, because in reality, they just subscribe
to the advocacy group’s Twitter feed. The second question is, Are messages that
prime the costs of collective action less effective? Perversely, encouraging subjects
to help overcome free-rider problems with costly actions may primarily serve to
reiterate that grassroots organizing is indeed personally taxing.
This is a surprising possibility given the traditional expectation that the Internet
has the ability to promote collective action by reducing transaction costs overall
(Farrell 2012). Twitter clearly possesses the properties—such as speed, reach, and
versatility—necessary for this to be the case. Despite these low structural costs,
organizations nevertheless compete for individuals’ limited attention online. Even
small changes in perceived costs can reduce the probability of collective action.
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Chapter3
Online Media Choice and Moderation
Despite vast changes in the way Americans seek out and receive information about
the world around them, political scientists still tend to conceptualize media effects
within a largely 20th-century framework. Campaigns target smaller and smaller
niches; new media outlets tailor their content to narrower audiences; videos of off-
the-cuff remarks spread virally within social networks. But unless the outcome of
such processes can be measured in aggregate vote returns or large-scale tracking
surveys, they seemingly remain illusory.
Making persuasive inferences about media effects requires surmounting an un-
usually challenging set of obstacles. Those outlined by Bartels (1993) as partic-
ularly difficult in a classic overview remain so today: with aggregate time-series
data, media coverage can easily be confounded by the events precipitating it; with
individual-level cross-sectional data, self-reported exposuremaybe correlatedwith
political interest or other unobserved predispositions; and laboratory experiments,
while ruling out alternative causal factors, still remain open to criticisms about ex-
ternal validity.
Adding to these challenges, measurement of exposure to media content in the
real world tends to be based on unreliable self-reports, irregularly validated prox-
ies, or aggregate traffic data that masks individual-level variation. When innova-
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tive solutions to the problem present themselves, they can be leveraged to produce
useful observational evidence on media exposure. But to generate convincing evi-
dence on effects, such a measurement strategy needs to be coupled with an exper-
imental approach.
Changes in technology and Americans’ media habits both add to the difficul-
ties and point the way toward possible solutions. One the one hand, a handful of
network and cable TV channels is now thousands of potential sources of news and
information about politics, driven by online-only (and often partisan) new media
outlets and feeds on social networks (Mutz and Young 2011). On the other, the pro-
liferation of data on users’ online habits means that it is now more possible than
ever to track individual behavior (King 2011; Bond et al. 2012).
This study explores how media effects play out online. More and more Amer-
icans get their news and information about politics online: According to Pew, in
2013 82% of Americans said they got news on a computer, and over half (54%) did
so on a mobile device (Pew 2014). While online media are not yet the primary
source of political information for most Americans, they are for the youngest age
groups, and the upward trend continues.
In some ways, these changes may make identifying media effects harder than
ever. For example, the “forced-choice” paradigm assumed by earlier studies of
media effects is not well-suited to an information environment that people can, in
part, construct and customize for themselves (Arceneaux and Johnson 2010). Selec-
tive exposure affects not only whether individuals see and hear particular content,
but how they consciously (and unconsciously) organize their entire media diets
(Bennett and Iyengar 2008, p. 724). Theoretically, this means that substantively
meaningful self-selection could have occurred well before exposure to any partic-
ular content is observed; passive consumption is perfectly compatible with active
curation. This insight merely pushes concerns about self-selection of congenial in-
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formation back one level: to the strategies and defaults arranged in advance rather
than the particular content heard or viewed on a particular occasion.
The most convincing evidence of media effects will come from research con-
ducted in naturalistic settings. This study uses a field-experimental design to iden-
tify the causal effect of individuals’ informational search strategies online. I com-
bine this approachwith directmeasures of subjects’ Internet behavior to testwhether
partisan selective exposure mediates the effects of political information online. In
doing so, I provide the first test of whether both a “balanced” news diet and selec-
tive exposure can coexist within the same framework.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief overview of the most
recent evidence on media effects and selective exposure. Second, I outline a new
theoretical contribution to the study of media effects in the context of open-ended
information search. I then introduce and provide unique observational evidence
on online media exposure. Next, I describe the design andmeasurement strategies
of two separate field experiments and report the results of each. A discussion then
concludes.
AMotivating Puzzle
Since the original Columbia studies, researchwithin the “minimal effects” paradigm
has often relied on the mechanism of selective exposure to explain null findings of
media effects (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Klapper 1960; Bennett and
Iyengar 2008; Arceneaux and Johnson 2010). Yet, as a growing number of scholars
have documented, the evidence for selective exposure is not as strong as initially
claimed. This leads to two related puzzles: First, why does the selective exposure
hypothesis find support in laboratory experiments but not observational studies
using real-world behavioral measures? And second, if selective exposure is not as
common as once believed, why are media effects outside the lab still modest and
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fleeting, if they can be identified at all?
These questions cut to the core of longstanding questions about the extent to
which democratic citizens are exposed to competing viewpoints, thought to be
a prerequisite for informed collective decision-making (Mutz 2006; Jamieson and
Cappella 2008; Shapiro 2013). In the worst-case scenario, most forcefully articu-
lated in the context of the 21st-century fragmented media environment by Sun-
stein (2007), people elect to consume only ideologically congenial information (the
“Daily Me”), resulting in an echo-chamber effect and, ultimately, increasing polar-
ization (see also Negroponte 1995). Others have additionally worried that hidden
algorithms could speed along this process by replicating and reinforcing people’s
preferences, especially on social media (Pariser 2011).
Since the critical review of Sears and Freedman (1967), however, skeptics have
questioned whether people are as selective in their choices of how to receive in-
formation as previously supposed. More recently, advances in measurement and
data collection have backed up these claims. For instance, Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2011) use aggregate web traffic data to conclude that ideological segregation on-
line is less severe than for national newspapers or in face-to-face social networks.
On Twitter, Barberá (2014) uses panel data to show evidence of cross-cutting follow
patterns that lead to moderation rather than polarization.
This body of work sits alongside research uncovering at least suggestive evi-
dence of selective exposure (Garrett 2009, 2013). First, there is experimental evi-
dence from the laboratory: The main finding of the studies conducted by Arce-
neaux and Johnson (2010) is that, consistent with Prior (2007), allowing subjects
the choice to “tune out” of political programming moderates the polarizing effect
of political news content. But among subjects who select in to political news, there
is an apparent sorting effectwhereby subjects spendmore timewith pro-attitudinal
than counter-attitudinal content. Other research finds a polarizing effect driven by
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people who are already fairly extreme in their views (Levendusky 2013). Second,
using panel data of over-time dynamics during a presidential campaign, there is
evidence of partisan selective exposure (Stroud 2008).
Howcan these findings be reconciled? It is likely that researchusing self-reported
measures exaggerate the evidence for selective exposure, given that people may
be more likely to remember using sources that align with their political identities.
Another possibility is that evidence of effects in the laboratory do not generalize to
the real world and that given day-to-day distractions and competing demands for
time, people’s propensity to select sources of congenial information is lower than
expected. Finally, it may be the case that under certain conditions, people can be
induced to behave in ways consistent with the selective exposure hypothesis, but
under others they fall back on more balanced media consumption habits.
I hypothesize that these conditions are determined by the requirements of a
given task. Seeking out particular information—for example, in the context of an
upcoming election or an issue that could affect an individual personally—means
relying on a set of open-ended search strategies that may differmarkedly from day-
to-day forms of media consumption. Central to the distinction between these two
modes is the idea of passive versus active reception of information. The former oc-
curs within a context of ingrained habits and defaults, while the latter may depend
on cues and heuristics that help people navigate less familiar territory (e.g., Popkin
1991).
More concretely, the picture given by the best observational evidence on me-
dia choice is that of a vast middle: Most people turn to large, relatively centrist
sources of new for political information. This pattern could be driven by a number
of mechanisms. Perhaps it is explained by a pattern of preference for ideologically
centrist content (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2011). Perhaps it reflects a general lack
of interest in political information or is even a byproduct of people’s preferences
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for non-political content. Or perhaps it is a result of something else: the defaults
and browsing habits of the online public.
I focus on this last possibility because it has the potential to explain how selec-
tive exposure as a mechanism could operate even against the backdrop of a rela-
tively balanced aggregate news diet. According to this view, media consumption
habits are the result of an interaction between preferences for content (whether
for entertainment versus news, or for a certain ideological slant) and the informa-
tion environment—the number of available sources, the cost of switching, etc. But
while contemporary accounts of Internetmedia tend to assume costs that approach
zero, they fail to take into account the hidden obstacles and defaults that structure
people’s habits online.
To take the simplest example, modern web browsers come pre-loaded with
bookmarks for large news and entertainment sites (such as AOL and Yahoo). Many
people still use portals for email and other serviceswhich link to headlines, weather
and other information. Sometimes, such sites automatically load on startup. It is
not hard to customize one’s settings, but doing so already requires preferences over
sources—a perceived cost that may be too high for many people. For individuals
with passing or intermittent interest in politics, for example, such built-in choices
may be sufficient for most day-to-day needs.
Conversely, people may need to rely on different strategies when actively seek-
ing out information (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2008). Rather than passively relying on
semi-hiddendefaults, it becomes necessary to use search engines, query one’s friends
or social networks (crowdsourcing), or consciously think about particular sources
of information that would be useful. If the passive mode encourages a tendency
toward centrism and homogeneity in media choices, active search creates oppor-
tunities for personal predispositions to creep in at every stage. Search engines and
social networks can customize results based on past preferences and actions, rein-
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forcing past biases; shortcuts based on partisan or ideological affinity could drive
decisions about media sources.
One interesting implication of this distinction between active and passive search
processes is that the former could eventually become incorporated into one’smedia
diet—novel strategies transforming into defaults. While speculative, this would
predict a long-term over-time trend toward more ideologically segregated media
diets, even from a relatively centrist starting point. This would explain the findings
of Stroud (2008), who found evidence of partisan selective exposure in panel survey
data (including respondents who reported online media use).
If this picture is accurate, then the observed lack of evidence for selective expo-
sure in observational data could be a result of choice architecture as much as peo-
ple’s preferences for diversity in media sources (e.g., Sunstein and Thaler 2008).
Likewise, when the structure of the information environment favors ideological
segregation–as it arguably does on Twitter, where it is easy to find co-partisans
and retweet only their content to like-minded followers—aggregate data follows
the same pattern (Conover et al. 2011). One question this paper poses is whether
the selective exposure mechanism can be separated from the media context, and
whether the persuasive effects of media content vary as a result.
This paper is structured in two parts. First, I take advantage of a large and
unique survey panel whose members record real-time tracking data on their on-
line browsing habits. Merged with individual-level survey responses, this data
offers an unprecedented look at the interaction between political predispositions
and media diet. In this first section, I provide an overview of the data and offer
an observational look at the political browsing habits of the survey’s respondents.
Second, I supplement this analysis with two online field experiments combining
similar direct measures of respondents’ online media exposure with individual-
level covariates.
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Balance or Bias in Online Media Exposure?
The first step of this investigation is to make use of a unique data set: individual-
level survey data merged with continuous tracking of panelists’ Internet browsing
behavior. This data, which is completely anonymized, was collected by the online
polling firm YouGov as part of an ongoing attempt to gauge whether survey re-
spondents are willing to install tracking software (calledWakoopa). This data pro-
vides direct evidence of respondents’ media habits for political (and non-political)
information. It is unique in that it combines data on site visits with individual-
level survey responses. For this particular panel, there are no limits to the types of
websites that can be included in the data. Moreover, the software tracks web traffic
(minus passwords and financial transactions) for all browsers installed on a user’s
computer and cannot be blocked.
The online tracking panel is currently branded as YouGov Pulse (see Figure 3.1).
Panelists are recruited from YouGov’s traditional participant pool via incentives.
At least initially, these incentives have been very strong: 4,000 “points” for signing
up and downloading the Wakoopa software—roughly 8 times the number offered
for a typical survey—and 1,000 additional points every month. Participants in on-
line surveys can redeem these points for clothing, prepaid gift cards, and other
merchandise.
The data set contains more than 6.3 million observations at the respondent-site
level, covering panelists who installed the tracking software on their desktop com-
puters (excluding mobile phones). This sample includes site visits from 1,392 in-
dividuals over a three-week period in 2015, from February 27 to March 19. Since
respondentswere not recruited using random sampling, YouGov typically employs
sample-matching weights to make its results representative of the general popula-
tion (Rivers 2006). For now, I refrain frommaking overgeneralizations but note that
the results below closely match similar analyses from the Mechanical Turk sample
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Figure 3.1: Screen shot of an email sent to YouGov panelists on April 8, 2015, invit-
ing participation in YouGov Pulse.
in the second study.
Table 3.1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the sample. Perhaps
most notably, it skews younger and more educated than the general population,
although the gender, racial and party breakdown are fairly representative and cap-
ture a more diverse cross-section than the MTurk samples discussed below.
Most directly, this data allows me to test whether respondents silo themselves
into informational cocoons according to partisanship or ideology. In order to mea-
sure the general ideological orientation of individual political websites, I employ
data from the Internet analytics firm comScore, which maintains a 12,000-person
survey panel of the general Internet audience called Plan Metrix. Employing both
direct responses and imputation, comScore provides estimates of the overall de-
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Table 3.1: YouGov Pulse Sample: Demographics
Category Proportion Category Proportion
18-30 0.233 Male 0.440
31-40 0.253 Female 0.560
41-50 0.156 Dem 0.367
51-60 0.230 Rep 0.224
61-70 0.113 Indep 0.305
Over 70 0.015 Other 0.038
No HS 0.033 White 0.679
High school 0.218 Black 0.103
Some college 0.377 Hispanic 0.069
College 0.250 Asian 0.059
Postgrad 0.123
mographic composition of individual sites’ audiences. Using these estimates from
March 2015, I create two separate audience-based measures of website slant. The
first employs the ideological self-placement of site visitors in the PlanMetrix panel.
I take the share of respondents who classify themselves as “very conservative” or
“somewhat conservative” as a fraction of those who place themselves anywhere
on the 5-point ideological scale (also including “middle of the road,” “liberal,” and
“very liberal”). This creates an index of conservative readership that can take val-
ues from 0 to 1, although practically speaking the scores do not go above 0.85. The
secondmeasure of slant uses the partisanship of PlanMetrix panelists: In a similar
way, I compute the Republican share of those who identify with either party.
The measures correlate with each other fairly well (r = 0.50). Since this is not
perfect, I present results using both measures for completeness. While the esti-
mates have high face validity, one peculiarity is evident from the figures below:
most popular sites tend to cluster somewhat left of center (0.5). This is an artifact
of the measures’ construction: Since no site achieves 100% conservative reader-
ship, the distribution is pushed to the left. Relative ideological placements are not
affected, however. Table 3.2 displays a sample of the most-visited websites in the
YouGov Pulse panel, along with the number of visitors logged over the three-week
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period and both measures of slant. Immediately apparent is that MSN News—
a mainstream, centrist news and information portal—is by far the most popular
source, by almost an order of magnitude. This somewhat matches the available
comScore figures, which show that among political and news sites logged in the
YouGov data, MSN is the second most visited overall (to CNN.com). Looking at
the partisan and ideological slantmeasures, it is clear that conservative sites such as
the Drudge Report and Townhall have higher scores than left-leaning sources such
as Slate. (One possible anomaly is Daily Kos, a left-liberal site whose ideological
score appears more accurate than the partisan one.)
Table 3.2: The partisan and ideological slant scores of some of the most-visited
sites in the sample, arranged in reverse order of popularity. All scores are listed in
Appendix C2.
Site Visits Part Ideo Site Visits Part Ideo
msn news 36263 0.447 0.339 bbc 1976 0.445 0.326
yahoo news 5000 0.451 0.341 theblaze.com 1640 0.496 0.348
foxnews.com 4777 0.521 0.372 cnn.com 1565 0.436 0.319
townhall.com 4372 0.571 0.450 breitbart.com 1317 0.507 0.404
buzzfeed.com 4077 0.412 0.285 nbcnews.com 1103 0.461 0.333
huffingtonpost.com 3898 0.453 0.337 wsj.com 994 0.46 0.362
nytimes.com 2532 0.449 0.332 telegraph.co.uk 952 0.432 0.324
news.google.com 2253 0.424 0.331 freep.com 914 0.503 0.350
drudgereport.com 2201 0.624 0.454 slate.com 852 0.414 0.285
daily kos 2148 0.483 0.331 nypost.com 764 0.456 0.362
washingtonpost.com 2025 0.471 0.351
Before combining these two sources of data together, I categorized the YouGov
Pulse panel’s site visits so that I could separate those relating to news and politics
from the rest of the web traffic.1 I also removed visits to local news websites to
focus on national sources. Confirming similar findings elsewhere (Flaxman, Goel
and Rao 2013), the resulting share devoted to news and information about national
politics is strikingly low: 1.6 percent of all visits, or just over 102,000 out of the
1I used a combination of Wakoopa’s proprietary categorization scheme and keyword searches
to categorize roughly 73% of website visits in the sample. The remaining sites comprise a “long
tail” with very few visits each.
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6,319,441 observations in the sample. I then separately aggregate the number of
visits per site for all respondents as well as those who identify as Democrats and
those who identify as Republicans. Overall, I could match 208 politics and news
websites in the sample to a measure of slant. For Democrats only, this number is
somewhat lower, at 175, and for Republicans there were 133 (Table 3.1 shows that
there were fewer Republicans in the sample, possibly driving this disparity).
Does the Internet facilitate the Daily Me? Figure 3.2, which plots the density
of site visits against the measure of ideological slant, shows that this is generally
not the case. Most site visits in the YouGov Pulse sample cluster around a handful
of relatively centrist sources such as CNN, MSN, and Yahoo! News. The density
curves for Democrats and Republicans are similar to each other and also to the
curve for the sample as a whole. The distributions are not bimodal, as extreme
ideological segregation would predict. However, there are two smaller bumps at
the extremes, corresponding on the right to popular conservative sites Townhall
and the Drudge Report. The bump on the left is actually Buzzfeedwhich, although
its overall audience might lean liberal, is generally considered a mainstream news
and entertainment site. The corresponding graph using the partisan slant measure
rather than the ideological measure is given in Appendix C3. The general pattern
is the same, although the scores are somewhat more dispersed.
The evidence, then, is consistent with a view that—among the small fraction of
respondents who actively visit news and politics websites—the preponderance of
the content encountered is relatively centrist and balanced ideologically. At least in
this sample, there also appears to be suggestive evidence of a smaller, intense sub-
group of Republicans who (possibly in addition to mainstream sources) consume
conservative, but not liberal, news and information about politics. A similar bump
on the left, corresponding to the popular viral site Buzzfeed, seems to be an artifact
of the ideological measure and not an indication of symmetric echo chambers in
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Figure 3.2: Density plot of aggregate site visits from the YouGov Pulse sample.
Site ideological slant on the x-axis is measured using comScore data on audience
composition. N = 102,128 visits.
online media diets.
MTurk Experiment Design
It is possible that this observational picture masks substantial variation. In order to
gain causal leverage on Internet search behavior in a real-world environment, this
study uses an online field experimental design. I take advantage of several innova-
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tions to improve measurement and inference. First, I capture outcomes on actual
browsing behavior via a small piece of software installed beforehand (with per-
mission) on subjects’ computers—the same approach as Study 2 in Chapter 1. Sec-
ond, I randomly assign panelists to receive an email treatment designed to induce
a purposeful, open-ended search for information about a particular, low-salience
political issue: the regulation of for-profit colleges and universities. This enables
a comparison between two sets of potential outcomes: those of subjects relying on
default strategies for processing political information, and those induced to expend
additional effort to seek out novel information.
Measurement Strategy
As in Chapter 1, I use a browser plug-in to capture a subset of that history (for a
prespecified list of sites and over a fixed length of time) and record it alongside
matching survey responses. I adapt this method for the current study’s measure-
ment strategy as follows. I created a small piece of software for Google Chrome
browsers that saves trace data from a user’s web history: whether or not any site
from a predetermined list has been visited in the past five days. When manually
activated, the browser plug-in takes this snapshot and transmits it to a Qualtrics
database, linked with the (anonymized) responses from the same user’s survey in-
put. In order to set up a panel of subjects with this software installed on their
primary computers, I posted a survey onMTurk collecting pretreatment covariates
and requesting that respondents optionally install the software for a 50-cent bonus
(on top of the small payment offered for completing the short survey regardless).2
2MTurk respondents could click for a list of the URLs scanned by the browser plug-in. I also
provided the source code for the software, written in JavaScript using Google’s Chrome API. These
steps were intended to reassure potential subjects that the software does not collect identifying
information or perform open-ended searches of users’ browser history. At the time the study was
conducted, Amazon’s MTurk terms of service prohibited requiring workers to install software as a
condition for being paid.
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One limitation of the direct measurement approach is that it assumes that the
list of URLs the software can search for in subjects’ histories is exhaustive. For
generic applications, this seems like a defensible assumption. However, for studies
of information search behavior, some users might seek out sources that are hard to
predict in advance. To generate the list of sources that the software can capture, I
combined two approaches. First, I collected data on average monthly unique vis-
itors from comScore, collecting sites listed in the “General News” category with
at least 300 per month, those listed under “Politics” with at least 50, and those in
the larger “News / Information” category with at least 1,500. I removed sites that
were primarily local, non-U.S., or non-news-related tomaintain the focus of the list.
Finally, I supplemented this list with the sites of the top 10 newspapers by total av-
erage circulation and entries from a number of partisan blog directories. The total
number of URLs generated using this first approach is 156.
I augmented this list of general news and politics sources using a second ap-
proachmore directly tailored to the particular design of this study. Thinking through
the possible steps of how one might look up information about a novel political
topic, I used as wide a net as possible for collecting URLs to check for: search en-
gine results from various queries related to the issue (“for-profit education,” “for-
profit colleges,” etc.); Wikipedia pages, social media, explainer sites, higher educa-
tion news sources, partisan sites, and even political non-news sites (such as Senator
Tom Harkin’s page dedicated to the issue). This generated an additional 72 links,
for a total of 228.3
Subject Recruitment
I recruited subjects via Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online marketplace for re-
questing and completing self-contained, relatively straightforward tasks Berinsky,
3See Appendix C1 for a full list of sites included.
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Huber and Lenz (2012). Of 1,500 initial respondents, N=467 both agreed to in-
stall the browser widget and successfully did so. From this experimental sample,
I then randomized subjects into either treatment and control, as described in the
next subsection. All subjects in the sample were in the U.S. and had at least a 95%
approval rate on previous MTurk tasks (sample characteristics: 65.7% male; 81.8%
white, 6.2% black, 6.9% Hispanic; 50.5% college-educated; 43.3% Democrat, 14.3%
Republican; median age, 29).
Timeline
Figure 3.3: Study timeline. The green and purple lines indicate the “memory”
of the browser plug-in software, which could only capture site visit data for the
previous 5 days.
Figure 3.3 visualizes the timeline of the study by showing the cumulative num-
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ber of respondents in each wave in blue. After the initial collection of pretreatment
covariates and installation of tracking software, the 467 subjects were assigned to
treatment and control via complete random assignment (days 4 and 5 of the study).
The pretreatment survey asked questions about attitudes on a number of dif-
ferent issues, in addition to demographic and political covariates. It was designed
in such a way as to make it difficult for a respondent to connect the content of the
surveywith the subsequent treatment. The treatment itself was an emailed encour-
agement to seek out information about one of the political topics asked about in the
previous survey (sent twice, 1-3 days after the initial survey). The MTurk system
allows requesters to sendmessages to workers who have completed previous tasks
(in this case, the pretreatment survey). Here, an otherwise irksome feature of this
particular subject pool—the fact that many workers complete dozens of different
tasks a day, including many social science surveys—becomes an advantage: Anec-
dotal evidence from communications with workers suggests that it is unlikely that
an emailed request to complete a subsequent task would be tied back to a given
earlier survey. This is crucial because while pretreatment covariates are useful for
producing efficient estimates, they should be collected in a way that minimizes the
likelihood of demand effects. Another advantage of this type of treatment is that it
is ecologically valid: MTurk workers often receive electronic requests to complete
additional tasks, and the present treatment is delivered in the context of subjects’
real-world, day-to-day information environments.
This overall approach is similar in spirit to that of Albertson and Lawrence
(2009), who analyzed an encouragement design in which telephone survey respon-
dents were randomly assigned to be asked to watch educational television pro-
grams. Follow-up surveys then asked respondents whether they complied and col-
lected post-treatment measures of knowledge, attitudes, and salience. I collected
the first two outcomes, although I only measured knowledge post-treatment in or-
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der to avoid anticipation or other demand effects. After giving subjects at least
two days to comply with the encouragement, I then sent another emailed request
(to those in both treatment and control) for responses to a follow-up survey (days
6-11). The recontact rate was high, at 93.4%.
In both the pretreatment and post-treatment surveys, I measured subjects’ me-
dia exposure via the tracking software. As as a result, I can construct measures
of subjects’ initial (baseline) recent media exposure and the additional sites visited
after that point for those who did and did not receive the treatment.
Treatment
In designing the treatment, I selected an encouragement intended to activate the
kind of search for novel political information that would uncover the influence of
selective exposure, if it is an identifiable mechanism. In particular, I asked subjects
to spend some time learning about a political topic (regulation of for-profit colleges
and universities) that affects many Americans and could conceivably be mapped
onto the partisan divide, but is not salient in current political debates.
To more specifically invoke the mechanisms I was interested in, I worded the
encouragement in the following way: “We’d like to follow up soon with a short
survey to gauge your responses to a fewmore questions. In the survey, we will ask
about the controversy over for-profit education. To prepare for that questionnaire,
we’d like you to familiarize yourself with the issue. Feel free to look up informa-
tion online the way you usually do, using whatever methods or sources you are
comfortable with to learn about for-profit colleges.”
MTurk Experiment Results
Here, I analyze the web browser data to look for patterns of selective exposure in
the treatment and control groups. First, I show below that the treatment was effec-
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tive: It caused respondents in the treatment group to seek out information about
an issue that, by and large, they were not highly knowledgeable about. I created an
indicator for respondents who visited at least one site on the list of sources specifi-
cally about for-profit education captured by the browser plug-in (72 possible), and
regressed it on treatment assignment. Given the possibility that some sources were
not included in the list of websites searched by the software, this is a lower bound.
Table 3.3 shows that being assigned to treatment caused a roughly 10-percentage-
point boost in the share of subjects who searched for information about the topic











Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
OLS, standard errors in parentheses.
Selective Exposure?
In looking for evidence of “selective exposure” in this section, I test whether sub-
jects’ partisan predispositions predict patterns of media choice. Strictly speaking,
I cannot make a causal claim: partisan and ideological commitments are not ran-
domly assigned. However, we can observe whether subjects’ behavior in the treat-
ment and control conditions seem to differ systematically in ways that are instruc-
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tive. To simplify presentation, I display the results—heterogeneous effects of treat-
ment on Democrats and Republicans’ partisan media diets—graphically below.
First, however, I need an approximate measure of media outlets’ partisan lean-
ings. For the purposes of this analysis, as described above, I again use the survey
data from comScore. To construct an individual-level measure of the partisan lean
of subjects’ media diets, I simply compute the average of the comScore partisanship
index (Republican share divided by the Democratic and Republican share) for each
site visited at least once by that person.
I begin with a plot of the correlation between subjects’ party identification and
the partisan lean of their (pre-treatment) media diets. Figure 3.4 shows that there
is such a correlation but that it is weak—an increase from just under 0.45 to approx-
imately 0.47 going from strong Democrats to strong Republicans. In general most
people consume political media near the “center,” where the center in this case is,
again, somewhat shifted to the left. Furthermore, one can see that the correlation
may partially be driven by extreme outliers: a handful of individuals with homoge-
nous, very liberal or very conservative media diets that correspond to their stated
political leanings.
What happens when we try to induce individuals to seek out new information?
Do they rely upon defaults and habits? If so, do these defaults nudge people in
the direction of centrist mass media or partisan sources? To shed light on these
questions, I run some simple linear models investigating the heterogeneous effects
of the treatment on subjects’ media diets. Table 3.4 shows the effects of treatment
on post-treatment media diet slant. Model 1 shows that the treatment alone has a
small but statistically significant effect in the leftward direction. I make no explicit
prediction about this main effect, but it may represent the overall critical nature of
commentary about for-profit education online, whichwould tend to support robust












































































































































































Media Diet by Party
Figure 3.4: This plot shows the correlation between individuals’ political predis-
positions (as measured by the standard 7-point party identification scale) and the
average partisanship of their media diet (before treatments were administered, in
the first survey wave).
pre-treatment measure of media diet, which was captured in the first survey wave
using the browser extension software. Not surprisingly, people’s over-time media
habits are strongly correlated.
Since it is highly prognostic, I include the pre-treatment measure in the subse-
quent models to improve the precision of the estimates. In Models 3 and 4, we see
a consistent pattern regardless of whether we investigate heterogeneity by party or
ideological leaning: the negative (but small) statistically significant interaction co-
efficient implies that the treatment pushes subjects’ media diets in a more leftward
direction the more conservative they are. This is the opposite of what we would
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expect from selective exposure. Rather than seeking out reinforcing information,
partisans in the sample sought out heterogeneous sources, resulting in moderation




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assigned Treatment −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01)






Treated x Party −0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
Treated x Ideology −0.01∗∗∗
(0.002)
Constant 0.46∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 286 229 217 229
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.29 0.33 0.32
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
OLS, standard errors in parentheses.
Party and ideology coded using 7-point scales.
Since interactions can be difficult to interpret, I further investigate these effects
graphically. Figure 3.5 plots the distribution of individuals’ averagemedia diet par-
tisanship for four groups: Democrats assigned to receive treatment, Republicans
assigned to receive treatment, Democrats in the control group, and Republicans
in the control group. Strikingly, as with the YouGov Pulse data, the same overall
pattern of centrist media exposure can be seen here, with one significant excep-
tion. Republicans in the control group had a more conservative overall media diet
on average, but after treatment was administered, the distribution of Republican
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subjects’ media diet partisanship moved sharply to the left. Thus it is the relative
moderation of Republicans in the sample driving the overall effect heterogeneity.
After that shift, the distributions of the four groups is essentially identical, again
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Individuals' Partisan Media Diets
Figure 3.5: Density plot of individuals’media diet partisanship, asmeasured by the
mean comScore partisan slant of all sites visited by each respondent post-treatment.
Lines denote party and treatment subgroups. Leaners are coded as partisans.
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More Comparisons
Finally, below I make further observational comparisons between groups in the
MTurk sample. In Figure 3.6, I look at the distribution of overall visits to political
news sources by different subgroups. Both plots show essentially the same pattern:
more or less identical distributions centered around relatively moderate, popular
websites. On the left, we see that treatment (gray lines) appears to boost the overall
volume of site visits but does not measurably alter the ideological flavor of people’s
media choices. And in the right panel, there appear to be few differences in the site
traffic of Democrats and Republicans within the treatment group. Again there is a
slight bump on the right, corresponding to the Drudge Report, but the picture is
not one of overwhelming ideological segregation. (The right panel is comparable






























































































































































































































To supplement theMTurk results, I designed an additional experiment to be run on
a subset of the YouGov Pulse panel discussed earlier. There are several advantages
to the additional study. First, I hope to alleviate concerns that results are being
driven by the unpredictable or idiosyncratic nature of the MTurk respondent pool.
Second, by taking advantage of theWakoopa tracking software already installed on
subjects’ computers, I was not restricted by the need to compile a comprehensive
list of potential sources to scan for; the software records all visits to facilitate coding
the results for relevant web traffic on the back end. Third, relevant demographic
and political covariates have already been collected on all panelists, allowing my
experiment to be embedded in respondents’ normal day-to-day survey usage with
only a single additional question. Finally, since implementation did not require
any steps to install new software, measurement occurred completely unobtrusively
and likely without subjects’ conscious awareness (but, of course, with their previ-
ous consent). Like the MTurk experiment, this study was designed to maximize
ecological validity and minimize the potential for demand effects.
For this experiment I chose a different issue, one that was not completely politi-
cized at the time of the survey but that clearly had the potential to polarize along
party lines. The issue was whether to allow Syrian refugees to settle in the United
States, and the surveywas fielded soon after Secretary of State John Kerry had pub-
licly committed to admitting a substantial number of refugees per year (but before
the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015). Subjects in the Pulse panel
were randomly assigned to be given the following question in the course of fill-
ing out a daily YouGov survey (those in the control condition were not shown the
question at all): “After several years of war and unrest, a large wave of migrants
and refugees from the Middle East, mainly Syria, has been fleeing to Europe. Re-
sponding to increasing pressure domestically and from European allies, Secretary
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of State John Kerry said last Sunday that the United States would accept 100,000
Syrian refugees per year by 2017. What is your view on the number of refugees the
United States should accept from that region per year?”4
In fact, the answers to the question are not of interest for the current study and
were intended merely to encourage thought about the subject. After answering
the question, those in the treatment group saw the following text on a new screen:
“Thank you for your response! We may be interested in following up with you in a
future survey as developments on the refugee crisis continue. Please keep inform-
ing yourself about this issue – just as you normally would for a political topic like
this one. We are not looking for any ‘right’ answer, and feel free to use sources you
typically turn to (including on the Internet) for news and information.” Notably,
subjects were not told that subsequent web visit data may be used to analyze the
slant of their media diet. This design is similar to theMTurk experiment except that
the survey question itself, rather than an email message, was the encouragement
to seek out information on a political topic.
The experiment was placed in the daily survey made available to YouGov’s sur-
vey panelists over the course of four days from September 25-28, 2015. Typically a
maximum of 1,200 panelists will respond to the daily survey on a given weekday,
and a fraction of those have the tracking software installed. In total, this procedure
returned 451 valid responses from Pulse panelists. However, only 120 of those gen-
erated Wakoopa data that could be used to measure outcomes (treatment: 61, con-
trol: 59).5 This is not a threat to inference since subjects were allocated to treatment
using simple random assignment (i.e., as they entered the survey). I usedWakoopa
4Possible responseswere “An unlimited number,” “Manymore than 100,000,” “Somewhatmore
than 100,000,” “100,000 is about right,” “Somewhat less than 100,000,” “Much fewer than 100,000,”
and “None at all.”
5YouGov investigated the possible sources of this issue, but the likeliest reason is that some
respondents were part of the Pulse panel but were either using different devices to access the survey
or had uninstalled the software from their computers.
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data collected for these respondents over a full week, from September 26-October
2.
In order to measure the partisan lean of subjects’ media diets, I used a combina-
tion of the procedures from the MTurk experiment and the observational portrait
of Wakoopa panelists above. Following the latter investigation, I subsetted sub-
jects’ traffic to sites about politics and news and merged the visits to partisan slant
scores using comScore data. Following the MTurk study, I averaged across all the
slant scores visited by a single respondent to create an individual-levelmeanmedia
partisanship score.
YouGov Experiment Results
Across two different experiments conducted on separate subject pools, with differ-
ent issues and distinct measurement approaches, the results are strikingly similar.
Figure 3.7 replicates Figure 3.5 almost exactly: We see a heterogeneous effect of the
encouragement to seek out information on a political topic, with the distribution of
Republican leaners’ average media slant moving toward that of Democratic lean-
ers (and Democrats’ media diets staying much the same in terms of partisan slant).
These results clearly rule out a polarizing effect, since any preexisting bias in me-
dia diets—as seen in the distinct peaks of the distributions with dotted lines—is
reduced to essentially zero. Against much conventional wisdom and existing theo-
rizing, it appears that this type of intervention is more likely to moderate subjects’
media diets than to polarize them according to partisan predispositions.
Table 3.5 reports these results in the form of OLS regressions in which the pa-
rameter of interest is the coefficient on the interaction between the treatment in-
dicator and partisanship (most notably here Lean Republican).6 The first result is
6In these results and in Figure 3.7 I fold “leaners” in with party identification. YouGov pro-
vides a three-point party ID scale (Democrat, Republican, Independent), which I augment with the
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Individuals' Partisan Media Diets
Figure 3.7: Density plot of individuals’ media diet partisanship in the YouGov
Pulse experiment, as measured by the mean comScore partisan slant of all sites
visited by each respondent post-treatment. Lines denote party and treatment sub-
groups. Leaners are coded as partisans.
the lack of a main effect: There is no hypothetical reason why we would expect an
overall partisan shift in media diet as opposed to heterogeneous effects (and here,
unlike with the MTurk study, the effect is essentially zero). The interaction, how-
ever, is estimated to be between -.03 and -.04, which translates to a sizable leftward
shift in the average slant of Republican leaners’ media diets caused by assignment
to the treatment encouragement. The magnitude of this shift amounts to roughly
10% of the possible range of media slant scores, and it is statistically significant
across all models (p < 0.05). Astonishingly, the effect of the treatment is enough
vative” or “very conservative,” I code him or her as a Republican leaner, and likewise for Democrats.
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to completely undo the baseline effect of being a Republican who is more likely
to visit conservative-leaning news websites in the first place. The precision of the
estimate also improves with additional covariate adjustment, as shown in Models
4 and 5 (p < 0.01).
It is possible that with other topics, we would see most of the movement among
Democrats rather than Republicans. Perhaps most of the information one could
encounter on both for-profit education and refugees tended to be on moderate to
left-leaning news sources. Theoretically we expect differential effect of treatment
by partisan attachment, not necessarily that it is concentrated among one particular
group.
Does Exposure Change Attitudes or Knowledge?
Until now, I have examined the effects of the treatment on participants’ media
habits. In the previous sections, I described how participants can be induced to
alter their media diet—in particular, Republicans and conservatives select some-
what more liberal sources on average, reducing the conservative lean of their in-
formation environment and producing moderation overall. Beyond the immediate
effect on exposure to specific content, however, an important question is whether
any downstream shifts in attitudes, opinions, or knowledge can be identified.
Table 3.6 summarizes the results, combining responses from the second survey
wave in theMTurk studywith the original treatment assignment and pre-treatment
covariates. It is immediately evident that there are no identifiable effects on views
about for-profit colleges7 or how to regulate them8; the estimated coefficients on the
treatment vector are small andhighly variable. By contrast, pre-treatment views are
7This is a 7-point scale from “For-profit colleges are extremely bad for American education” to
“For-profit colleges are extremely good for American education.”
8This was a 5-point scale from “The government should regulate for-profit colleges much more
strongly” to “The government should regulate for-profit colleges much less strongly,” with more
regulation coded as positive.
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Table 3.5: Experimental data from YouGov Pulse. Dependent variable is the aver-
age partisan slant of each respondent’s post-treatment media diet, and the treat-
ment is encouragement to learn about the Syrian refugee issue. There is no main
effect, but there is a significant heterogeneous treatment effect among Republican
leaners in a more liberal direction.
Dependent variable:
Media Diet Partisanship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Assigned Treatment −0.01 −0.01 0.005 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Independent 0.01 0.01 0.02∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lean Republican 0.01∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗















Treatment x Independent −0.01 −0.02 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Treatment x Lean Republican −0.03∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.46∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Other covariates included?
Family Income no no no yes yes
Race no no no no yes
Region no no no no yes
Observations 97 96 96 96 96
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.08
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
OLS, standard errors in parentheses.
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highly correlated with post-treatment responses. In the third and fourth columns,
however, amore complicated picture emerges for the effects of treatment on knowl-
edge. First, from Column 3 we see that a main effect is not evident. Column 4
shows evidence of heterogeneity by party affiliation, however: Being assigned to
receive the encouragement message appears to have had no effect on Democrats
(−0.37 − 0.34 + 0.70 = −0.01) but actually reduced knowledge about for-profit col-
leges among Republicans (−0.37− 0.79 + 1.01 = −0.15).
These findings are clearly against expectations. Given the limited power of the
experiment and the possibility that conditional average treatment effects of this
kind may be due to chance, I hesitate to speculate about the significance of these
results. Notably, these are intent-to-treat estimates focusing on the effect of being
assigned to treatment rather than the effect of complying with the treatment—that
is, seeking out information about for-profit colleges if and only if encouraged to do
so.
Attitude Change: Puzzling Additional Results
Last year, I implemented a pilot version of the same study on MTurk, with minor
differences (N=348).9 I include the results here to highlight the fact that the findings
are not consistent: While I found null effects on opinions above, I found strong
effects previously (but none for knowledge). Clearly, more research is needed.
Table 3.7 shows the results of regressions of post-treatment attitudes on treat-
ment assignment, pre-treatment views, partisanship, and interactions. Despite the
fact that the treatment did not specify the valence of content to look up, it seemed
to have an overall negative effect on subjects’ views toward for-profits (possibly as a
result of negative press in recent years). Column 1 shows the main effect, a modest
9Out of 1,000 initial respondents, 348 both agreed to install the browser widget and successfully
did so. From this experimental sample, I then block randomized subjects into either treatment
and control. Sample characteristics: 61% male; 79% white, 6% black, 7.5% Hispanic; 47% college-










Assigned Treatment −0.25 0.05 0.08 −0.37
(0.21) (0.13) (0.17) (0.26)
Incognito 0.06 0.09 −0.08 −0.16
(0.47) (0.29) (0.59) (0.58)
Chrome 0.25 0.13 0.09 0.17
(0.21) (0.13) (0.27) (0.26)
Democrat −0.06 0.10 −0.34
(0.26) (0.16) (0.32)






Treatment x Dem 0.24 −0.11 0.70∗
(0.29) (0.18) (0.36)
Treatment x Rep 0.11 −0.03 1.01∗∗
(0.39) (0.24) (0.47)
Constant 0.61∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 3.77∗∗∗ 3.35∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.20) (0.29) (0.40)
Observations 436 436 436 436
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.49 −0.01 0.03
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
OLS, standard errors in parentheses.
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0.38-point decrease along the 7-point attitude scale. Column 2 shows no average
difference in views betweenDemocrats or Republicans. Column 3 includes interac-
tions between treatment and the party indicators, which suggest that essentially all
of the change in views is driven by Democrats becoming less supportive. Repub-
licans are also estimated to move in the same direction, but this is not significant
(likely because the sample had far fewer Republican-leaning subjects). The last
three columns show that the heterogeneous effects worked for partisan identifica-
tion but not ideological self-placement.
Table 3.7: Views toward for-profit colleges, earlier study.
DV: View (T2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-treatment View 0.68∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Assigned Treatment −0.38∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.43∗∗∗ −0.19





Treatment x Dem −0.69∗∗∗
(0.26)






Treatment x Lib −0.25
(0.29)
Treatment x Con −0.60
(0.37)
Constant 1.33∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24)
Observations 318 318 318 304 304
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Weighted regressions (to take into account block randomization),
robust standard errors in parentheses.
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I show essentially the same results, but for the dependent variable measuring
subjects’ views about the regulation of for-profit colleges and universities, in Ap-
pendix C4. In short, the treatment had a positive effect on subjects’ belief in regu-
lating the schools.
In this pilot study, I also tested for effects on knowledge, measured in the post-
treatment but not pre-treatment survey, and salience. I found mixed to null results
for both, although the estimates for knowledge came close to statistical significance.
It is possible that improving the efficiency of the estimates with pretreatment co-
variates would have allowed me to identify significant effects on knowledge, al-
though I specifically sought to avoid priming subjects with knowledge questions
before the treatment was administered.
One possible reason for the discrepancy in findings is a change in the way I
recorded the primary dependent variables in the second survey wave. In the pilot
study, I simply asked subjects who returned for the second wave their opinions on
for-profit colleges and how to regulate them, along with a set of knowledge ques-
tions. The attitude and policy opinion questions were worded identically to the
ones I asked in the pre-treatment survey. It is possible that treated respondents re-
membered the previous questions and sought to give the “correct” (more critical)
answers given the tenor of the coverage they may have exposed themselves to. In
the later MTurk experiment, by contrast, I included the same questions in the sec-
ond wave—but, as in the pre-treatment survey, I grouped them in with questions
on unrelated subjects in an attempt to mask the goal of the study. Thus, it is possi-
ble that the earlier findings were essentially the result of demand effects (see, e.g.,
Green, Calfano and Aronow 2014).
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Discussion
In this two-part investigation, I show that—at least among respondents in an opt-
in sample—there is no strong evidence that individuals cluster into ideologically
segregated information cocoons. Aggregated over more than 100,000 visits, the
ideological flavor of most content respondents exposed themselves to is generally
centrist. Rather than the strong bimodal prediction made by theorists who express
concerns about online echo chambers, the most-visitedmedia sources heavily clus-
ter in the middle. One possible caveat to this conclusion is suggestive evidence of a
smaller group of conservatives who consume primarily right-leaning content, but
this would have to be replicated with either a more representative sample or with
properly weighted data.10
I couple this observational portrait of panelists’ balanced media diets with two
experimental designs that likewise do not reveal strong evidence of ideological seg-
regation. In particular, Figure 3.6 shows how aggregate site visits cluster around
the center (with another small bump on the right corresponding to Drudge). Ran-
domly inducing participants to educate themselves about a novel, non-salient polit-
ical issue does not induce patterns of partisan selective exposure; if anything, there
is evidence of a heterogeneous effect in which Republicans expose themselves to
more liberal content, resulting in overall moderation of media diets.
Regardless of the patterns of exposure I document, evidence of media effects re-
mains elusive. In themain experimental study, I find nomeasurable effects of being
encouraged to seek out information about for-profit colleges on attitudes about the
issue or opinions about how to regulate them. There is only suggestive evidence of
possible differential effects on knowledge, although it is difficult to interpret. In the
pilot study, I found positive effects on attitudes and opinions, but the dependent
10In the version of the figure produced using the partisan, rather than the ideological, measure
of media slant (shown in Appendix C3), there is also a bump on the center-left corresponding to
Democrats visiting Talking Points Memo.
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variable in wave 2 was collected in a fashion that may have encouraged demand
effects for subjects in the treatment group.
It is possible that a different choice of issue might have resulted in different
findings. For instance, an issue that is more salient, better maps onto the partisan
divide, or ismore likely to trigger “hot cognition”may have induced participants to
seek out reinforcing information (Redlawsk 2002; Lodge and Taber 2005). Issues of
this typemay generate a different pattern of results than those reported here. I note
that while further tests should be undertaken, the current evidence of moderation
on relatively non-salient, potentially cross-cutting policy issues directly addresses
the greatest concerns of the informational cocoon theorists. For if even novel infor-
mation about underpoliticized issues reverberate inmutually exclusive echo cham-
bers, then the prospects for deliberation and consensus are especially dire.
As a result of treatment, subjects likely relied on the kinds of low-cost defaults
that typically direct readers to mainstream and centrist (rather than niche and ex-
treme) sources: search engines, homepages, and bookmarks. The results suggest
that subjects who sought out information about a complex, non-salient political
topic were not generally following a directional motivation or seeking out only
congenial content (Kruglanski 1999). Or, at least, that motivation was not strong
enough to overcome the cost of overcoming ingrained media consumption habits
and the defaults built into the typical Internet user’s daily browsing environment.
Perhaps, then, rather than facilitating invisible “filter bubbles,” defaults can actu-
ally serve as a moderating filter for new information (Pariser 2011).
Aside from the particular mechanism of the exposure findings, there are multi-
ple potential explanations for the lack of observedmedia effects. One possibility, as
mentioned before, is that some sort of demand effect was at play in which respon-
dents in the pilot study’s treatment group sought to give the “preferred” answer
to the post-treatment questions about for-profit colleges and how to regulate them.
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In essence, subjects who remembered having been asked to research the issue may
have connected that task to the survey items. This would have been less of an issue
with the main study, which embedded the primary questions of interest in a larger
survey with unrelated items.
Still, if the findings from the study represent the “true” effect, then the question
of why effects are muted or nonexistent remains. The era of “minimal effects” in
which mass-media messages were thought to filter through community interme-
diaries and social groups may not resemble 21st-century America (Klapper 1960;
Putnam 1995). But on the other hand, people are in some ways more networked
than ever—at least online. Has the nature of the intermediaries simply changed?
Another possible explanation is that some form of “transactive memory” is in play,
in which people effectively “outsource” their knowledge to the Internet. Psycholo-
gists have argued, in essence, that a form of mental division of labor can take place
within couples and among groups (Wegner, Giuliano and Hertel 1985; Holling-
shead 1998; Kozlowski and Ilgen 2006), and recent research has applied this insight
to the modern-day reality of ubiquitous access to reference sources online (Fisher,
Goddu and Keil 2015). Given these findings, it seems plausible that subjects who
complied with the encouragement treatment simply did not retain any new infor-
mation (as measured by the knowledge items)—even if they felt they had learned
about the topic of for-profit education. A final possibility is that there were effects,
but that theywere simply too fleeting to be captured in the follow-up survey, which
for some subjects was several days after receiving the last encouragement message
(e.g., Gerber et al. 2011).
As scholars continue to design studies of informationdynamics andmedia choice,
especially in online environments, these findings will hopefully reinforce the im-
portance of taking into account the difficult-to-measure contextual factors that guide
politically relevant information-seeking behavior.
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Appendix A3: Supplementary Graphs and Tables
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Figure A1: Total number of visits per site across all treatment conditions. Top 50








































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A3: News recall broken down by individual story and predictor. The x-
axis plots, from left to right, general knowledge, reported media exposure, and
actual media exposure as measured by the Link Classification Task. The y-axis plots
the average number of stories recalled, out of 3. Each row represents a different
treatment condition. The Colorado story is in green, the Duck Dynasty story is in
pink, and the unemployment benefits story is in brown.
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Table A1: Balance checks for randomization, pooled data from Studies 1 and 3
(N=1112).
Note: ∗p<0.05
Treatment Group Means Difference in Means
1 (Check-all) 2 (Open-ended) 3 (Yes/no) 1-2 1-3 2-3
Age 31.64 29.58 30.95 2.06 0.69 -1.37
(11.38) (9.08) (10.51) (-0.75)* (-0.81) (-0.70)
Race 1.87 1.65 1.74 0.22 0.13 -0.09
(1.75) (1.54) (1.63) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.11)
Hispanic 0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.02
(0.25) (0.28) (0.26) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02)
Female 0.38 0.42 0.37 -0.04 0.01 0.05
(0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.03)
Income 3.30 3.18 3.21 0.12 0.09 -0.03
(2.45) (2.37) (2.34) (-0.17) (-0.18) (-0.17)
Education 4.05 4.05 4.00 0.00 0.05 0.05
(1.35) (1.29) (1.34) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.09)
Ideology 3.32 3.10 3.05 0.23 0.27 0.05
(1.50) (1.51) (5.53) (-0.11)* (-0.29) (-0.29)
Party ID 2.23 2.26 2.38 -0.02 -0.14 -0.12
(1.32) (1.33) (1.32) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.09)
Knowledge 2.81 2.79 2.76 0.02 0.05 0.03
(1.04) (1.02) (1.00) (-0.07) (-0.08) (-0.07)
Attention 2.80 2.84 2.59 -0.03 0.21 0.24
(0.98) (1.04) (5.39) (-0.07) (-0.28) (-0.28)
Computer 0.83 0.85 0.80 -0.02 0.03 0.05
(0.38) (0.36) (0.40) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.03)
Cleared 0.41 0.32 0.34 0.09 0.08 -0.01
(0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (-0.03)* (-0.04)* (-0.03)
Purple 0.18 0.20 0.23 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
(0.38) (0.40) (0.42) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.03)
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Over Under Mis Over Under Mis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Open-Ended −0.63∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.59∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.07) (0.37) (0.10) (0.08) (0.33) (0.09)
Yes/no 0.44∗∗∗ 0.002 0.38∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.12 0.39∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.08) (0.21) (0.06)
Age −0.002 0.01 −0.0002 −0.005∗ 0.004 −0.0004
(0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.003) (0.01) (0.003)
Pacific 0.29 0.84∗∗ 0.44∗ 0.37 0.26 0.42∗
(0.26) (0.38) (0.23) (0.78) (0.47) (0.23)
Other 0.18 −1.58 −0.23 0.17 −1.86 −0.25
(0.18) (1.40) (0.29) (0.20) (1.34) (0.29)
Native −0.93∗∗∗ −2.42 −1.48∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗ −61.94∗∗∗ −1.49∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.98) (0.45) (0.16) (1.62) (0.44)
Black 0.19∗∗ −0.01 0.14 0.19∗∗ −0.12 0.12
(0.09) (0.33) (0.09) (0.09) (0.25) (0.09)
Asian −0.08 0.12 −0.03 −0.07 0.09 −0.03
(0.10) (0.27) (0.09) (0.12) (0.18) (0.09)
Hispanic −0.20∗ 2.22 0.33 0.01 1.72 0.36
(0.12) (2.03) (0.35) (0.14) (1.54) (0.36)
Female −0.07 0.08 −0.03 0.03 0.24 −0.01
(0.06) (0.25) (0.07) (0.07) (0.22) (0.06)
Income −0.003 0.07 0.01 −0.02 0.04 0.01
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01)
Education 0.03 0.24∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.02 0.15 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.11) (0.03)
Ideology −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.01∗∗
(0.003) (0.02) (0.004) (0.004) (0.02) (0.01)
Party ID 0.0002 0.10 0.02 0.004 0.04 0.02
(0.02) (0.15) (0.03) (0.02) (0.15) (0.03)
Knowledge 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.20 0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04)
Attention −0.01∗ −0.001 −0.01 −0.22∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Computer −0.11∗ 0.39∗ 0.004 −0.16∗∗ 0.18 −0.002
(0.06) (0.23) (0.07) (0.08) (0.30) (0.07)
Cleared 0.28∗∗∗ −0.37 0.13∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ −0.45∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.06) (0.24) (0.06) (0.07) (0.24) (0.06)
Purple 0.17∗∗∗ −0.51 0.02 0.16∗∗ −1.91∗∗ −0.03
(0.06) (0.59) (0.13) (0.07) (0.87) (0.12)
Constant 0.80∗∗∗ −1.43 0.62∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ −1.95 0.75∗∗∗
(0.16) (1.17) (0.26) (0.22) (1.23) (0.25)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01129
Appendix A4: Comparison of Samples
While there was substantial attrition in Study 2, it appears that the final sample
was not significantly skewed from the full sample (which included respondents
who did not install the browser widget). As the table below illustrates, the minor
differences in observed characteristics were well within sampling variability. Re-
gardless, “treatment effects" for this study are local to subjects who “complied” by
installing the software.
(For reference, category 3 of the income scale corresponds to incomes between
$30,000-39,999, and category 4 of the education scale corresponds to a two-year
college degree. Ideology and party identification are the usual 7-point scales.)
Full Sample Subsample Difference
Age 30.34 28.75 1.59
(10.58) (9.56) 0.16
Income 2.89 3.14 -0.25
(4.98) (2.29) 0.44
Education 4.0 3.95 0.05
(1.33) (1.29) 0.75
% Female 38.14 32.94 5.2
(48.62) (47.28) 0.35
%White 77.86 74.12 3.74
(41.56) (44.06) 0.46
% Black 6.09 5.88 0.21
(23.93) (23.67) 0.94
Ideology 2.77 2.59 0.18
(6.39) (1.45) 0.57
Party ID 2.32 2.27 0.05
(1.34) (1.38) 0.75
N 568 85
Table A3: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of demographic and
political characteristics of respondents in both the full sample and the subsample
containing only those who successfully installed and ran the browser widget. The
third column lists the differences in means followed by p-values (in italics) gener-
ated by two-sample t-tests.
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Appendix A5: Site-Level Determinants of Reported Exposure
The findings from Studies 1-3 illustrate that open-ended questions are substantially
better than the other types for the purpose of measuring the overall audience for
news and its distribution across different outlets. Here, I explore whether charac-
teristics of the sites themselves might also play a role in respondents’ overall ten-
dency to over- or underreport exposure. I focus on two: the popularity of sites as
gauged by the number of unique visitors, and the partisan tilt of the sites’ read-
ership. If respondents are merely reporting exposure to sources because they are
popular—perhaps leading websites to be more accessible in memory—this could
lead to overreporting, all else equal. Furthermore, the partisan characteristics as-
sociated with particular sites may have an effect on individuals’ tendencies to re-
port visiting them. Are people less willing to report exposure to Democratic- or
Republican-leaning sites, or perhaps sites with any partisan leaning at all?
To answer these questions, I gathered additional data on total unique monthly
visitors per site from comScore, averaged from October to December 2013. For the
data on partisan leanings, I relied on comScore’s Plan Metrix service, which pro-
vides 12-month aggregated data from a running panel survey with approximately
12,000 U.S.-based participants.11 In particular, I used the service’s “Composition
Index” for self-identified Democrats and Republicans, which captures the degree
to which visitors to a given site from either group are over- or underrepresented as
compared to the total Internet sample. The Republican Composition Index ranges
from 29.3% to 207.3%, and the Democratic index ranges from 43.7% to 174.2%. I
simply took the Republican share of the two indexes and divided by 100. To gauge
partisan leaning, I computed the standard deviation of each site’s Republican and
Democratic indexes—a somewhat crudemeasure intended to capture the variation
11These panelists are themselves a subset of the larger Media Metrix panel. All respondents are
age 18 or older.
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in how the two groups are over- or underrepresented in the audience for a given
site.
I use total reported exposure for each site from Studies 1 and 3 as the dependent
variable, pooled across treatment conditions. In all models, I included an indicator
for whether a particular site was one of the choices in the check-all and yes/no
questions, since, as the above graphs demonstrated, those question formats have a
tendency to generate overreporting. In all, there was sufficient data for 116 of the
available sites.
Table A4: OLS and quasi-Poisson regressions with Huber-White robust standard
errors.
DV: Total reported visits per site
OLS Quasi-Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total actual exposure 1.30∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.12) (0.0004)
Unique visitors/1m 2.49∗∗ 2.60∗∗ 1.39 0.01∗∗∗
(1.19) (1.05) (0.92) (0.004)
Partisan leaning 0.06 −0.03∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.01)
Share R composition −17.21 2.27 −1.54 −0.41
(34.35) (14.91) (23.39) (2.37)
Included in check-all/ 148.18∗∗∗ 84.91∗∗∗ 3.97∗∗∗
forced-choice Q’s? (33.09) (16.19) (0.25)
Constant 1.46 −11.34 −16.74 0.99
(17.05) (7.61) (14.47) (1.24)
N 116 116 116 116
R2 0.57 0.80 0.87
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.79 0.86
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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I report several different OLS models with robust standard errors in addition
to a full quasi-Poisson model that takes into account the overdispersion in the de-
pendent variable. As Table A4 shows, inclusion in one of the closed-ended sur-
vey questions is strongly associated with reporting exposure to a particular web-
site. There are two possible reasons for this finding. First, the indicator is likely
capturing some of the effects of two of the treatment conditions on overreporting
in general. And second, by construction, those question types include selections
of well-known sites that respondents are likely to make. This suggests potential
multicollinearity in two of the independent variables, total unique visitors and the
question indicator, and indeed they are strongly correlated (r = .527). This is one
possible reason why overall site traffic drops out of significance in the third model.
Still, whether as a result of inclusion in survey questions or more directly, the as-
sociation between a site’s total audience and reported exposure is clear in Model
2.
The Republican share of the composition index has no apparent effect on re-
porting exposure. A partisan tilt in either direction, on the other hand, predicts
less reporting overall in the quasi-Poisson model, although this finding does not
hold in the OLS models. And finally, even holding the other factors constant, total
actual exposure as measured by the Link Classification Task predicts total reported
exposure, demonstrating the validity of the measure.
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Appendix B1
The treatment-by-treatment analysis of the heterogeneous effects of the tweet en-
couragement relied on an assumption that all subjects who signed the petition in
the organizer treatment would have done so in the followers treatment as well.
This assumption is not guaranteed to hold if there are some subjects who would
only respond to one treatment or the other. Table B1 describes the eight theoreti-
cally possible types of subjects. The first type, for example, would sign the petition
regardless of treatment condition. The second type, however, would only sign the
petition if assigned to the public tweet or the organizer directmessage treatments—
but not if assigned to the follower condition.
Table B1: Possible Subject Types
Type Public Tweet Only Organizer Follower Population Proportion
1 1 1 1 π1 = 0
2 1 1 0 π2 = 0
3 1 0 1 π3 = 0
4 1 0 0 π4 = 0
5 0 1 1 π5 = ?
6 0 1 0 π6 = ?
7 0 0 1 π7 = ?
8 0 0 0 π8 = [0.955, 0.965]
We know that the proportions of types 1 through 4 in the population are all
equal to zero: no subjects in the public tweet conditions signed the petitions. To-
gether, types 5 though 7 account for approximately 3.6% of the population in Study
1 and approximately 4.5% of the population in Study 2; type 8 accounts for the re-
mainder.
The crucial question for us is the proportion of types 6 and 7, π6 and π7. If they
are both equal to zero, then we induce no bias when we condition on DM type in
the second-stage experiment. If, however, there are 6’s or 7’s that sign the petition,
then conditioning would in fact induce bias. What evidence do we have that the
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proportion of 6’s and 7’s are both equal to zero?
First, we know that equal proportions of subjects signed the petitions in the
organizer and follower DM treatments. In Chapter 2, we describe well-estimated
average differences between the two conditions to be very close to zero (and cer-
tainly not statistically significantly different from zero). We can therefore infer that
π6 = π7:
E[Y |Z = Organizer] = π5 + π6
E[Y |Z = Follower] = π5 + π7
E[Y |Z = Organizer] = E[Y |Z = Follower]
π5 + π6 = π5 + π7
π6 = π7
If π6 and π7 did not equal zero, then they would have to exactly counterbalance
one another, which is possible, but unlikely. It would be especially unlikely for
π6 = π7 = c > 0 across a wide variety of subjects. A heterogeneous effects analysis
of the “organizer” versus “follower”manipulation by network centrality suggested
no difference in treatment effects at any level of centrality. This does not constitute
conclusive proof that the only types in the population are 5’s and 8’s, but it is sug-
gestive. The analyses in Chapter 2 rely on this assumption and should be weighed
with the plausibility of this assumption in mind.
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Appendix B2: Randomization Checks
In this section, we present randomization checks for Studies 1 and 2. In particular,
under random assignment of the treatment, we would expect the pre-treatment
covariates to be balanced across the three treatment conditions. Equivalently, we
would expect that the covariates would not predict treatment status. For each ex-
periment, we will present three randomization checks:
1. Balance tables, presented in Tables B2 and B3. The tables present means and
standard errors for four pre-treatment covariates: Account Type (male, fe-
male, organization, unknown), Number of Followers, Days on Twitter, and
Eigenvector Centrality.
2. Tests of independence for each covariate, shown in the last columns of Tables
B2 and B3.
• Study 1 was carried out using complete random assignment, so we can
directly apply the chi-square test to the categorical variable (Account
Type) and the f -test of joint independence to the continuous variables
(Number of Followers, Days on Twitter, and Eigenvector Centrality).
• Study 2 was carried out using block random assignment, so we condi-
tion the test on the experimental block, and aggregate the tests to form
a single p-value using Fisher’s method (Fisher 1925, Section 21.1). Addi-
tionally, we use Fisher’s exact test in lieu of the chi-square test because
of the low cell count within a single stratum. The required assumption
that themargins are fixed is met by design (a fixed number of treatments
are allocated to a fixed distribution of account types).
3. Omnibus test of joint independence of all the covariates from the treatment
assignment, presented in the last rows of Tables B2 and B3. This is conducted
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using a randomization inference procedure:
• We obtain the likelihood ratio statistic from a multinomial logistic re-
gression of treatment assignment on the covariates.
• We permute the random assignment 1,000 times according to the origi-
nal random assignment protocol.
• We obtain the likelihood ratio statistics from regressions of these 1,000
simulated treatment assignments on the covariates.
• We construct a p-value by observing the frequency with which the sim-
ulated statistics exceed the observed statistic.
Table B2: Experiment 1 Balance
Treatment Assignment
Public Tweet Follower Organizer p-value
Account Type: Female 0.309 0.287 0.307
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Account Type: Male 0.381 0.375 0.401
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Account Type: Organization 0.245 0.254 0.230
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Account Type: Unknown 0.065 0.083 0.061
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 0.072
Number of Followers 596.240 616.603 635.733
(14.146) (22.099) (23.357) 0.312
Days on Twitter 1631.438 1637.362 1637.179
(8.983) (14.189) (14.153) 0.910
Eigenvector Centrality 0.039 0.038 0.038
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 0.960
N 3687 1500 1500
Omnibus p-value: 0.607
137
Table B3: Experiment 2 Balance
Treatment Assignment
Public Tweet Follower Organizer p-value
Account Type: Female 0.315 0.329 0.348
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Account Type: Male 0.405 0.392 0.379
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Account Type: Organization 0.224 0.222 0.214
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Account Type: Unknown 0.056 0.056 0.059
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 0.425
Number of Followers 585.599 580.738 581.281
(14.469) (16.999) (16.996) 0.535
Number of Tweets 1559.503 1554.428 1552.586
(10.067) (12.131) (11.988) 0.601
Eigenvector Centrality 0.032 0.031 0.030
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.537
N 3495 2498 2514
Omnibus p-value: 0.113
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Appendix B3: Heterogeneous Effects of Treatment
Notes for both tables: Eigenvector centrality, Number of Followers, and Days on Twit-
ter in standard units and centered at zero. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B4: Experimental Materials
Figure B1: A screenshot of the tweet encouragement randomly shown to respon-
dents in either of the DM conditions who completed the online petition.
Figure B2: A screenshot of the pop-up window shown to respondents who clicked
the tweet button.
143
Figure B3: The top half of the online petition whose link was sent to subjects in the
DM conditions in Study 1.
144
Figure B4: The top half of the online petition whose link was sent to subjects in the
DM conditions in Study 2.
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Figure B5: The public tweet from Study 1.
Figure B6: The public tweet from Study 2.
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Appendix B5: Privacy and Ethical Considerations
Our research design presents ethical challenges common to field experiments im-
plemented in online environments. In particular, like much unobtrusive field re-
search, we could not obtain informed consent from subjects without compromis-
ing our inferential strategy. In proceeding with these studies, we relied on our own
judgment that the benefits of the study outweighed any risks to subjects.
Furthermore, since most Twitter activity is public by design, we took a series of
steps to protect subjects’ anonymity. To ensure that our approach toward consent
and privacy met common standards for minimizing any potential harm, we ob-
tained IRB approval from one of the authors’ home institutions [details withheld].
Below, we detail several considerations that we believe are crucial to evaluating the
ethics of the experiments reported here (as well as others with similar designs).
Twitter’s Policies
Twitter’s privacy policy, available at https://twitter.com/privacy, ex-
plicitly informs users that their public profile information and tweets are made
immediately available to third parties, including research institutions:
For instance, your public user profile information and public Tweets are
immediately delivered via SMS and our APIs to our partners and other
third parties, including search engines, developers, and publishers that
integrate Twitter content into their services, and institutions such as
universities and public health agencies that analyze the information for
trends and insights. When you share information or content like pho-
tos, videos, and links via the Services, you should think carefully about
what you are making public.
This policy, part of the terms of service for all users, ensures that collecting
public tweet data is firmly within the bounds of reasonable use.
147
Data Privacy
LCV’s experience mobilizing its members while protecting their privacy gener-
ally assuaged our concerns. We acknowledge, however, that in collecting data for
this study we make public information somewhat more accessible. No individual
tweets are revealed in the study, and personally identifiable information such as
user names, descriptions, network connections, and location have been removed
from all replication files.
Organization’s Goals
A final concern regards the nature of the manipulation. The messages used in both
studies were approved by LCV as part of ongoing social media campaigns directly
related to its core goals. As shown in Figure 2.2, LCV posts approximately 6 tweets
or retweets per weekday on average; the public tweet component of the experi-
ments’ design was designed to fit in with the organization’s existing day-to-day
engagement strategy.
Private direct messages (DM) are less commonly used by organizations, but
practically speaking these are nomore intrusive than amass email message. In this
case, by signing up for Twitter and voluntarily following LCV’s account, subjects
assigned to receive a DM in effect opted to receive communications from the latter
via the former.
However, we do not take these concerns lightly. Despite the fact that both stud-
ies’ messages were part of a preexisting social media campaign, we acknowledge
that the DM treatments comprised an unorthodox communications strategy. The
petitions may also have taken several minutes of subjects’ time. In response, we
note that LCV’s follower count has continued to rise and that we find no evidence
of a backlash effect of any kind.
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Appendix C2: Measuring Sites’ Political Slant
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Table C1: List of online news sources and the corresponding partisan slant index,
computed by dividing the percentage of the site’s audience identifying as Repub-
lican in comScore’s Plan Metrix panel by the percentage identifying with either
party.
Site % Rep (out of R+D) Site % Rep (out of R+D)
shortlist.com 0.230 nytimes.com 0.449
scotsman.com 0.235 yahoo news 0.451
smithsonianmag.com 0.257 dailymail.co.uk 0.453
lifenews.com 0.307 huffingtonpost.com 0.453
abcactionnews.com 0.337 dallasnews.com 0.454
lifesitenews.com 0.344 therightscoop.com 0.455
dw.de 0.362 nydailynews.com 0.455
mediaite.com 0.373 upi.com 0.456
talkingpointsmemo.com 0.374 nypost.com 0.456
baynews9.com 0.375 cbsnews.com 0.456
rawstory.com 0.378 abovetopsecret.com 0.459
philly.com 0.379 wsj.com 0.460
knoxnews.com 0.379 newsnet5.com 0.461
metro.co.uk 0.395 nbcnews.com 0.461
bostonglobe.com 0.395 ifyouonlynews.com 0.465
chron.com 0.400 mirror.co.uk 0.466
alternet.org 0.402 salon.com 0.467
cnsnews.com 0.403 express.co.uk 0.468
thesun.co.uk 0.403 wn.com 0.468
mentalfloss.com 0.403 aljazeera.com 0.470
usnews.com 0.407 washingtonpost.com 0.471
worldtruth.tv 0.407 huffingtonpost.ca 0.474
newsok.com 0.408 latimes.com 0.476
theatlantic.com 0.409 vox.com 0.476
addictinginfo.org 0.411 usatoday.com 0.479
buzzfeed.com 0.412 beforeitsnews.com 0.480
motherjones.com 0.413 daily kos 0.483
slate.com 0.414 bloomberg.com - politics 0.483
sfgate.com 0.414 newsnow.co.uk 0.484
9news.com 0.419 detroitnews.com 0.491
theguardian.com 0.423 theblaze.com 0.496
takepart.com 0.424 abc7news.com 0.499
news.google.com 0.424 freep.com 0.503
theweek.com 0.425 medium.com 0.503
chicagotribune.com 0.426 breitbart.com 0.507
npr.org 0.428 ynetnews.com 0.510
startribune.com 0.429 mercurynews.com 0.511
examiner.com 0.430 ijreview.com 0.516
cbc.ca 0.430 newsmax.com 0.519
time.com 0.432 foxnews.com 0.521
telegraph.co.uk 0.432 nymag.com 0.523
newsobserver.com 0.433 foreignpolicy.com 0.525
csmonitor.com 0.436 nzherald.co.nz 0.526
cnn.com 0.436 newsbusters.org 0.529
buffalonews.com 0.437 dailystar.co.uk 0.541
hawaiinewsnow.com 0.437 nationalreview.com 0.545
thedailybeast.com 0.442 mynews13.com 0.556
nj.com 0.443 politico.com 0.556
abc news 0.444 newsiosity.com 0.566
iflscience.com 0.444 townhall.com 0.571
vice.com 0.444 redflagnews.com 0.574
bbc 0.445 rightwingnews.com 0.577
msn news 0.447 daytondailynews.com 0.599
newyorker.com 0.447 news-leader.com 0.609
today.com 0.449 drudgereport.com 0.624
newsday.com 0.449 kingworldnews.com 0.718
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Table C2: The ideological slant index is computed by dividing the % of the site’s
audience identifying as “very” or “somewhat” conservative by the%placing them-
selves anywhere.
Site % Con Site %Con
scotsman.com 0.095 alternet.org 0.291
duluthnewstribune.com 0.103 universetoday.com 0.293
montgomerynews.com 0.119 mentalfloss.com 0.293
msnewsnow.com 0.162 bostonglobe.com 0.293
national geographic 0.162 heraldsun.com.au 0.295
dailyrecord.co.uk 0.168 chron.com 0.299
buzzle.com 0.181 iflscience.com 0.3
starnewsonline.com 0.189 time.com 0.303
polar.com 0.193 dailydot.com 0.303
mansfieldnewsjournal.com 0.193 jamaica-gleaner.com 0.305
guardianlv.com 0.195 newsobserver.com 0.305
smithsonianmag.com 0.2 topix.com 0.305
thenational.ae 0.203 news-journalonline.com 0.306
newstimes.com 0.208 mediaite.com 0.307
newstatesman.com 0.212 whydontyoutrythis.com 0.307
wsws.org 0.213 news-leader.com 0.308
newsnow.co.uk 0.214 takepart.com 0.309
japantimes.co.jp 0.217 onenewsnow.com 0.309
pasadenastarnews.com 0.219 yournewswire.com 0.311
manchestereveningnews.co.uk 0.221 theatlantic.com 0.311
bringmethenews.com 0.221 usnews.com 0.313
irishtimes.com 0.223 huffingtonpost.ca 0.315
shortlist.com 0.227 miamiherald.com 0.316
expressnews.com 0.229 wvmetronews.com 0.316
theaustralian.com.au 0.23 mirror.co.uk 0.316
stuff.co.nz 0.235 euronews.com 0.317
huffingtonpost.co.uk 0.235 daytondailynews.com 0.317
newsone.com 0.237 today.com 0.317
thesun.co.uk 0.237 hawaiinewsnow.com 0.318
presstv.ir 0.242 startribune.com 0.318
lifenews.com 0.243 cnn.com 0.319
minutemennews.com 0.247 toprightnews.com 0.319
vancouversun.com 0.247 commondreams.org 0.32
enterprisenews.com 0.247 theweek.com 0.322
collective-evolution.com 0.254 sfgate.com 0.323
sputniknews.com 0.254 vice.com 0.323
addictinginfo.org 0.258 telegraph.co.uk 0.324
catholicnewsagency.com 0.26 about.com 0.324
news.com.au 0.262 npr.org 0.325
motherjones.com 0.27 bbc 0.326
newsok.com 0.273 talkingpointsmemo.com 0.326
globalpost.com 0.276 newspapers.com 0.326
newser.com 0.277 cnsnews.com 0.326
nymag.com 0.277 nationalinterest.org 0.327
cbc.ca 0.28 aljazeera.com 0.328
deseretnews.com 0.281 examiner.com 0.328
rt.com 0.283 countercurrentnews.com 0.328
slate.com 0.285 alarabiya.net 0.329
buzzfeed.com 0.285 dailymail.co.uk 0.33
newrepublic.com 0.285 voanews.com 0.331
smh.com.au 0.285 salon.com 0.331
rawstory.com 0.286 news.google.com 0.331
abc.net.au 0.287 daily kos 0.331
abovetopsecret.com 0.288 nytimes.com 0.332
abs-cbnnews.com 0.288 nydailynews.com 0.332
dw.de 0.291 nbcnews.com 0.333
ynetnews.com 0.291 theguardian.com 0.334
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Site % Con Site %Con
worldtruth.tv 0.335 americannews.com 0.37
newsherald.com 0.335 dailynews.com 0.371
onenewspage.com 0.335 foxnews.com 0.372
globalnews.ca 0.336 vox.com 0.376
themoscowtimes.com 0.336 theglobeandmail.com 0.379
csmonitor.com 0.337 therightscoop.com 0.384
huffingtonpost.com 0.337 knoxnews.com 0.385
firstcoastnews.com 0.337 news-record.com 0.385
detroitnews.com 0.338 newsday.com 0.392
ifyouonlynews.com 0.338 lifesitenews.com 0.392
msn news 0.339 newsmax.com 0.393
philly.com 0.339 bangordailynews.com 0.396
dallasnews.com 0.34 redflagnews.com 0.399
latimes.com 0.34 breakingnews.com 0.402
chicagotribune.com 0.34 theepochtimes.com 0.404
newsweek.com 0.341 breitbart.com 0.404
upi.com 0.341 newsiosity.com 0.411
yahoo news 0.341 rightwingnews.com 0.416
buffalonews.com 0.342 mercurynews.com 0.419
independent.co.uk 0.345 thedailybeast.com 0.425
madworldnews.com 0.346 nzherald.co.nz 0.427
foreignpolicy.com 0.347 express.co.uk 0.43
theblaze.com 0.348 gulfnews.com 0.431
cbsnews.com 0.348 charismanews.com 0.436
pbs newshour 0.349 news-gazette.com 0.438
nj.com 0.349 beforeitsnews.com 0.45
bloomberg.com - politics 0.35 townhall.com 0.45
freep.com 0.35 standard.co.uk 0.45
independent.ie 0.351 newsdaymarketing.net 0.451
washingtonpost.com 0.351 nationalreview.com 0.451
usatoday.com 0.356 drudgereport.com 0.454
medium.com 0.356 onlinenewspapers.com 0.454
wn.com 0.356 thejournal.ie 0.454
newsbusters.org 0.356 ctvnews.ca 0.457
newyorker.com 0.356 kingworldnews.com 0.465
trueactivist.com 0.357 firstpost.com 0.466
newszoom.com 0.357 spiegel.de 0.47
breakingisraelnews.com 0.36 twcnews.com 0.473
winknews.com 0.36 dailystar.co.uk 0.474
metro.co.uk 0.361 lemonde.fr 0.479
nypost.com 0.362 digitaljournal.com 0.497
wsj.com 0.362 newsminer.com 0.532
jpost.com 0.363 erietvnews.com 0.579
israelnationalnews.com 0.365 marinij.com 0.588
ijreview.com 0.366 news-press.com 0.65
politico.com 0.369
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Appendix C3: Media Diet, Partisan Slant
Figure C1: Density plot of aggregate site visits from the YouGov Pulse sample. Site
partisan slant on the x-axis is measured using comScore data on audience compo-
sition (see Appendix B). N = 102,134 visits.
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Appendix C4: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure C2: As this figure shows, most respondents in the YouGov Pulse panel vis-
ited no or very few political news sources during the three-week period the data
was collected. Barely visible on the right are a tiny proportion of panelists who
logged thousands of hits to political sites during that period.
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Table C3: Opinions about regulating for-profit colleges, earlier study.
DV: Regulate (T2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regulate (T1) 0.63∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Z 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ −0.07

















Constant 1.41∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27)
Observations 318 318 318 304 304
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.50
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Weighted regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses.
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